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CONTROL RIGHTS COULD BE ADAPTED TO
SERVE THE TAX AUTHORITY
ILYA BEYLIN†
INTRODUCTION
There has been some hullabaloo about governments
worldwide taking equity stakes in troubled banks1 and car
companies.2 The surprised and at times outraged tone of the
hullabaloo reveals a broadly shared and incorrect belief that
governments do not already have equity stakes in enterprise.
Governments, including our own, regularly take equity stakes in
distressed corporations.3 In fact, governments have a substantial
†
J.D., 2008, University of Chicago; B.A.S., 2003, Stanford University. This
Article has been much improved by criticism received from Douglas Baird, Clark
Durant, Jesse Edgerton, Christine Graham, Ed Kleinbard, Anup Malani, Sam
Sellers, Alex Raskolnikov, and David Weisbach, and from participants at talks at
which it was presented.
1
For an explanation of the benefits to government involvement in bank
restructuring, see AUGUSTIN LANDIER & KENICHI UEDA, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
THE ECONOMICS OF BANK RESTRUCTURING: UNDERSTANDING THE OPTIONS 9 (June
4, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0912.pdf.
2
See Conor Clarke, What Socialism Looks Like, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2009),
http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/conor_clarke/2009/06/what_socialism_looks_
like.php (responding to some of the hullabaloo with a pie chart that compares
publicly to privately managed assets in the United States, without accounting for
the government’s equity position explained in this Article).
3
Governments, including the U.S. government, have taken equity stakes in
distressed firms for decades. For instance, the Public Benefits Guarantee
Corporation (“PBGC”) interjects itself between insolvent employers and their
pensioners, partly meeting defined benefit obligations to the pensioners and in
exchange becoming a claimant in the employer’s bankruptcy. As a claimant, the
PBGC receives assets of the bankrupt entity or an interest therein. On occasion, the
interest is that of a shareholder. See, e.g., U.S. Sees Profit on Airline Loan Guarantee
Program, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/200601-30-loan-profits_x.htm (discussing the PBGC’s equity stakes in the reorganized
U.S. Airways and United airlines). The government has also occupied an exclusive
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equity stake in each corporation, distressed or not, via the tax
authority’s claim on a fraction of corporate income. Some degree
of government ownership and control of enterprise is an
inevitable consequence of a functional income tax.4
This
observation not only challenges popular notions that recent
direct investments by the government in public corporations5

ownership and control role in the resolution of failed banks. The present statutory
scheme under which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) may
liquidate or operate failed banks has been in place for over thirty years. See
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006).
4
In 1945, Evsey D. Domar and Richard A. Musgrave explained that “[b]y
imposing an income tax on the investor, Congress appoints the Treasury as his
partner who will always share in his gains, but whose share in his losses will depend
upon the investor’s ability to offset losses against other income.” Evsey D. Domar &
Richard A. Musgrave, Income Taxation and Risk Taking, 23 TAXES 60, 60 (1945).
The insight that “the income tax grants the tax authority economic rights in firms
comparable to those enjoyed by shareholders” has been developed at length by public
finance and corporate finance literature investigating the effect the tax authority’s
interest has on firms’ risk preferences. For example, in 1985, Richard C. Green and
Eli Talmor elaborated a model showing the conflicting incentives progressive tax
rates created for and against risk taking. See Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, The
Structure and Incentive Effects of Corporate Tax Liabilities, 40 J. FIN. 1095, 1095–96
(1985). Legal scholars working in the tax field have recognized the similarity
between shareholders’ and the tax authority’s economic rights. See Louis Kaplow,
Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT’L TAX. J. 789,
797 n.5 (1994); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Cashless Corporate Tax, 55 TAX L. REV. 1, 1
(2001). Working from that insight in 2000, Herwig J. Schlunk developed a proposal
to replace the corporate income tax with a “ ‘cashless corporate tax’ (CCT).” Id. The
proposal expressly sought to do away with subsidies accomplished through the
Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”) in the form of favorable tax rates for certain
forms of enterprise, which it divided into three categories: (1) those intended by
Congress, (2) those representing administrative compromises, and (3) those
unintended. See id. at 5, 7. The resulting uniform tax rate would be operationalized
through virtual nonvoting shares in the taxpayer-corporation. See id. at 33–36. The
proposal assumed a world without agency costs, where firms were run to maximize
true economic income to shareholders. Id. at 2 n.1. By tying shareholders’ returns to
the tax authority’s returns, the CCT would end shareholders’ efforts to reduce tax
liability as any such reduction would proportionately reduce their own returns.
Whereas the CCT proposal advocates replacement of the tax authority’s economic
rights with those of shareholders, this Article instead considers whether it would be
worthwhile to add shareholders’ control rights to the tax authority’s economic rights.
5
For example, the government has taken equity positions and/or made loans to
General Motors, Chrysler, AIG, Bank of America, and Citigroup. See DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, TARP TRANSACTIONS REP. 1, 14–17 (2009), available at http://
www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transactionsreport_08042009.
pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (summarizing cumulative government investments
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program and redemptions by the investees for the
period ending July 31, 2009).
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represent adventurous departures from the status quo6 but also
prompts a puzzle:
If the government’s economic interest
resembles that of a shareholder, why is it denied the control
rights shareholders typically enjoy?
The traditional taxonomy of participants in a firm’s capital
structure divides them between debtholders and shareholders.7
The former sit atop the capital structure, removed by bankruptcy
priority and contractually fixed interest payments from the risks
and returns the latter face below.8
Differences between
debtholders’ and shareholders’ economic interests lead to
conflicts over business strategy.
Control rights paired to
debtholders’ and shareholders’ economic interests are designed to
resolve these potential conflicts without hindering productive
efforts of the firm. The primary puzzle prompting this Article is
how—in the absence of control rights traditionally afforded to
shareholders—the tax authority protects its interests.9
The tax authority stands in two distinct positions vis-à-vis
each firm.10 First, the tax authority promotes the government’s
6
See, e.g., Hugh Hewitt, Just Say No to Government Motors and Obamacars,
WASH.
EXAM’R
(June
1,
2009),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
opinion/columns/Hugh-Hewitt/Just-say-no-to-Government-Motors-and-Obamacars46615602.html (“The very idea of a socialized American car company ought to cause
millions of Americans to reject the idea of doing their car shopping at those
venues.”).
7
Financial engineers have irradiated these basic categories to produce a
bewildering menagerie of interests, which have been studied at length in financial
and legal literature. See generally THE CREDIT DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES, INNOVATIONS, AND MARKET DRIVERS (Greg N. Gregoriou & Paul Ali
eds., 2008) (discussing contemporary strains of credit derivatives); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation’s Newest Challenge to
the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1322–27 (1991) (discussing the evolution of
equity derivatives).
8
See O’Hare v. Comm’r, 641 F.2d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the
taxpayer should be treated as a creditor rather than as an equityholder in a venture
because the taxpayer was not exposed to the risk of the venture); Comm’r v. O.P.P.
Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) (“The shareholder is an adventurer in
the corporate business; he takes the risk, and profits from success. The creditor, in
compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of
success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date arrives.”).
9
See Kaplow, supra note 4 (“By owning nonvoting shares through taxation—in
the past, shares approaching or exceeding 50 percent—rather than directly, the
government is subject to the other shareholders diverting proceeds to themselves at
the expense of the silent partner—i.e., through tax avoidance and evasion.”).
10
Revenue raising and regulation may not be distinct ends but rather distinct
means. The government may use revenues to finance its regulatory agenda or may
forego revenue through favorable tax rates that encourage taxpayers to pursue its
regulatory agenda. If a sufficient amount of congressional intelligence is assumed,
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interest as regulator. It does so by imposing relatively lower
rates on congressionally favored forms of enterprise. Second, the
tax authority serves a revenue raising function, which is
accomplished through a right to share in firms’ revenues.11 That
right to share in firms’ revenues is similar to that possessed by
the firms’ shareholders. Specifically, both share in the residual
of a firm’s earnings after expenses have been paid.12 But while
the economic rights of shareholders and the tax authority show
profound similarities, the control rights afforded to the latter
take a drastically different form from those afforded to the
former. Unlike a shareholder, the tax authority cannot vote for
representatives on the board of directors, cannot threaten
management with a transfer of its interest to those more able to
impose discipline, and cannot align management’s interests with
its own by sharing a portion of tax receipts with them. Thus, it
lacks three basic tools shareholders use to focus management on
the interests of equity: corporate democracy, the market for
control, and the market for management.13 Moreover, directors
and officers do not owe the tax authority fiduciary duties that
protect other interest holders from their disfavor. Having
identified that shareholders and the tax authority have similar
economic interests in a firm, but that the latter lacks control
rights possessed by the former, Part II considers three questions.
then the contours of the Tax Code will reflect legislative judgment as to which
projects are more effectively delegated to private actors.
11
Though this Article focuses its discussion on corporations, its reasoning
generally applies to other business entities. If the tax authority’s control rights in
corporations were in excess of those in businesses taxed as pass-through entities,
incorporators would face higher incentives to avoid subchapter C. The deadweight
loss to tax avoidance prompted by corporate taxation has been extensively
addressed. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Incidence and
Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms
Produce the Same Good, 97 J. POL. ECON. 749, 749 (1989); Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
& Roger H. Gordon, How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN. 477,
477–78 (1997). But few, if any, of the control rights typically possessed by
shareholders could not also be adapted in favor of the tax authority in pass-through
contexts.
12
See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1096; Schlunk, supra note 4.
13
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 677 (2007) (critiquing theories of managerial discipline through
shareholder democracy); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (developing the disciplinary effect of the
mergers and acquisitions market on management); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic
Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134, 134 (1973)
(developing the disciplinary effect of compensation structure on management).
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First, does the tax authority need distinct control rights? If
taxes served solely the goal of generating revenues, the tax
authority could simply be granted nonvoting common shares in
every corporation and rely on assertive shareholders to safeguard
its interest.14 As is, however, taxes are designed to do more than
raise revenues—they are also used to encourage congressionally
favored behavior.15 In other words, the tax authority as interest
holder does not only care about how much the taxpayer earns but
also about how the taxpayer earns it. As a result, the interests of
shareholders and the tax authority are not always aligned, as the
latter operates under statutory directives that balance raising
revenue with encouraging congressionally favored enterprise. If
it were not allowed distinct control rights, the tax authority could
not steer firm strategy when private and public policy diverged.
Second, if the tax authority requires distinct control rights,
why not grant it the same rights as those possessed by
shareholders? Part II proposes a series of alternative designs to
the contemporary tax system that adapt safeguards afforded to
common shareholders to serve the tax authority. The practical
and theoretical consequences of adopting these alternatives are
discussed. While both a market of control and a market for
management could be implemented to benefit the tax authority,
neither could, without more, simultaneously accommodate the
tax authority’s regulatory and financial goals. For example, if
the tax authority were allowed to auction off its tax receipts or
reward management when firms pay more in taxes, tax revenues
would improve, but the incentives imposed by differential tax
rates to pursue congressionally favored behaviors would weaken.
The same would be true if fiduciary duties were owed to the tax
authority.
The third question is, given that the tax authority lacks the
legal protections provided to shareholders, how is its distinct
economic interest in the firm safeguarded? The control rights of
the tax authority take the form of a mandatory dividend
calculated based on the source of income as well as its amount.
This substitute is not surprising. Firms in jurisdictions where
14

See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 1–2.
See Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Address
Before the Chicago-Kent College of Law Federal Tax Institute: Rethinking Tax
Expenditures (May 1, 2008), in STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 9 (Comm. Print 2008).
15
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shareholders’ control rights are otherwise weak are required to
pay mandatory dividends to ensure earnings are distributed to
shareholders rather than misappropriated by their fiduciaries.
The novel feature is the variation in effective tax rates, which
seeks joint maximization of the competing goals of revenue and
regulation. Part III explains how in addition to being an effective
substitute for traditional control rights, the design of the
mandatory dividend provides lawmakers with a series of levers
that may be used to set risk policy across private enterprise.16
Because the tax authority shares in the income from a period but
does not fully share in the loss, the tax system poses a
disincentive to risk seeking. The strength of that disincentive
can be affected through changes in the tax rate or the ability of
taxpayers to carryover losses between years.
I. CORPORATE FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL17
Every corporation begins its life as a legal abstraction—a
certificate of incorporation issued from the office of a secretary of
state.18 Before becoming self-sufficient through operations that
produce enough cash to cover its expenses, a corporation survives
on money raised from investors.19 Corporate finance studies the
choices firms face when financing their operations and the
consequences of those choices.20 Firms offer instruments that

16
See generally Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1103–06 (explaining how a
progressive tax reduces risk taking by a solvent firm).
17
Those familiar with basic issues in corporate finance are encouraged to skip
Part I.
18
The office issuing corporate charters and the procedure to receive them vary
by state. For example, in Delaware, charters are issued by the Secretary of State
and require the filing of a certificate of incorporation setting forth the name of the
new corporation, its address and the address of its incorporator(s), its scope of
business, and the number and par value of its authorized shares. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §§ 101–03 (2010).
19
Firms with sufficient cash flows to cover their costs may also turn to outside
financing, for example, to expand or redeem incumbent investors.
20
See Eugene F. Fama, The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing
Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 272, 272–74
(1978) (discussing assumptions under which the capital structure of a firm does not
affect its value).
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provide their purchasers claims to the firm’s assets.21 Investors
purchase these instruments on the primary market, with the
purchase price going to the firm.22
Each instrument establishes a contract between its issuer
and holder, which provides certain rights to the holder in
consideration for the capital received by the issuer. At the core of
the bundle of rights provided for by an instrument are economic
rights or those rights that define the holder’s share of the
earnings of a firm and its assets in liquidation. For example,
prototypical debtholders have rights to receive a fixed stream of
payments and, in liquidation, be repaid in full before any
payments are made to shareholders. Prototypical shareholders
may receive dividends from retained earnings so long as
sufficient cash remains to pay debts as they come due and, in
liquidation, have rights to what assets remain after debtholders
have been satisfied. The instruments that a firm issues to
acquire capital comprise the firm’s “capital structure.”
In addition to conferring economic rights, instruments
provide their holders with rights that safeguard those economic
rights. These safeguards are referred to as control rights.
Control rights are primarily concerned with ensuring that
management does not follow policies that maximize returns to
other interest holders at the instrument holder’s expense. As
this Part will explain in more detail, the business decisions that
provide optimal returns to the investor depend on the investor’s
position in the firm’s capital structure.
A firm’s management team decides between business
projects.23 Projects have a range of returns. These ranges may
be described by their mean or by their volatility. Volatility of
returns is frequently referred to as risk.24 Projects may have
21
Some interests, such as those in a general partnership, also impose
obligations.
22
The proceeds received by the firm are purchase price less transaction costs.
How instruments are marketed is the province of securities laws. After being sold on
the primary market, instruments may be traded on the secondary market, though
the gain or loss realized through such trades does not directly inure to the firm.
23
Part I.B discusses the separation of decisionmaking power between
shareholders, directors, and officers in more detail. For now, the individuals who
make the decisions as to which projects to pursue are referred to as the management
team.
24
Risk may be decomposed into firm specific and systematic risk. See generally
HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS 102–15 (Blackwell 1991) (1959) (explaining how portfolio
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lower or higher mean returns than other projects. Projects may
also be riskier or less risky than other projects. A firm’s
management team must decide between projects that have
varying risk and return profiles. In general, debtholders will
prefer lower risk projects and shareholders will prefer higher
return projects.25
The preferences may be understood by
returning to the prototypical claimholders introduced above.
Once the firm has sufficient assets to meet debtholders’ claims,
debtholders would prefer for the firm to reduce risk no matter
what such reduction would cost in terms of returns.26
Shareholders, on the other hand, may sacrifice low risk returns
when such returns would not provide the firm with sufficient
assets to meet debtholders’ claims. Thus, if either debtholders or
shareholders had exclusive control over selecting a firm’s
projects, the firm would end up making inefficient tradeoffs
between risk and return.27
A firm engaged in financing is an impartial creature.28 It
cares only to raise the most capital, without caring from whom it
diversification reduces performance volatility). The former may be reduced through
diversification of investments across firms. Diversification imposes administrative
costs, as even the most passive index has to be rebalanced at the expense of
brokerage fees. Moreover, diversification greatly reduces firm specific risks but does
not wholly eliminate them. While in the abstract, it may be more correct to discuss
the conflicts of interest between stakeholders as to nondiversifiable risk—as other
risk could be neutralized through diversification—except where the distinction
should be emphasized, this Article will leave risk unqualified, and arguably be
simpler and truer to reality, where diversification is neither free nor perfect.
25
See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979) (explaining conflicts
of interest between debtholders and shareholders as to dividend payments, claim
dilution, asset substitution, and underinvestment).
26
Management may either act to further the interests of other claimholders at
the expense of shareholders or to further its own interests at the expense of
shareholders. The latter threat may be ameliorated by the participation of
debtholders in the capital structure. There is evidence for the proposition that
management tends to pursue suboptimal strategies that reduce diversifiable risk at
the expense of revenue. See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Does Corporate
Ownership Structure Affect Its Strategy Towards Diversification?, 20 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 1063, 1064 (1999) (reviewing studies before concluding that management
tends to prefer suboptimal levels of risk reduction); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs
of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324
(1986) (explaining how reduction of retained earnings through debt financing may
increase managerial discipline).
27
See Fama, supra note 20, at 282.
28
See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Optimal Security Design, 1 REV. FIN.
STUD. 229, 229–30 (1988) (“An important question concerns how . . . securities
should be optimally designed; in other words, how should the payoffs to a security be
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raises capital. When a firm seeks to raise capital, it is in the
firm’s interest to commit to a corporate policy of pursuing
projects with maximum risk adjusted returns. As discussed
above, instruments provide their holders claims on the issuing
firm’s assets. A firm’s assets, in turn, consist of the sum of
proceeds from financing and net returns. Thus aggregate claims
to a firm’s assets become more valuable as a firm’s net returns
increase, so a firm that can promise higher risk adjusted returns
faces a lower cost of capital.29 To decrease cost of capital, control
rights accompanying instruments have been designed to avoid
the troubling possibility that a firm will forego a business plan
that maximizes aggregate returns because its management is
dominated by one group or another. The remainder of this Part
reviews the economic rights and safeguards enjoyed by
prototypical debtholders and equityholders.30
A.

The Economic and Control Rights of Typical Debtholders

A debt instrument entitles its holder to recover the principal,
or the purchase price of the instrument, by the maturity date of
the instrument.31 In addition to the principal, the issuing firm
will pay the holder interest on the principal to compensate the
holder for the time value of the principal as well as risk.32 Thus a
allocated across states of nature in order to maximize the amount the issuer
receives?”); Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Security Design, 48 J. FIN. 1349,
1369 (1993) (“The perspective in our theory of security design is that a firm will
partition its total asset cash flows into different claims because this maximizes its
expected revenue.”).
29
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (explaining that stakeholders in a firm only receive
voting rights “to the extent those rights are beneficial to the whole enterprise”).
30
The next Part reviews the economic and control rights of the tax authority. It
is important to note that while a firm will raise more capital on net if it accompanies
the instruments it issues with control rights designed to increase after-tax risk
adjusted returns, the firm does not similarly benefit from control rights that
maximize pretax returns.
31
See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968)
(discussing the tax consequences of treating an instrument as either debt or equity
and providing a multifactor balancing test—which includes “the relative position of
the obligees as to other creditors regarding the payment of interest and principal”
and the “contingency [of] the obligation to repay”—to evaluate whether the
instrument should be treated as debt or equity for tax purposes).
32
A debtholder’s risk exposure may be decomposed into interest rate risk,
counterparty default risk, reinvestment risk, call risk, prepayment risk, and
purchasing power risk. For an explanation of the risks faced by a debtholder, see
KENNETH R. KAPNER & JOHN F. MARSHALL, THE SWAPS HANDBOOK 56–69 (1992).
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debtholder’s economic rights are usually limited to a return of
principal and interest.33 So long as a firm’s expected earnings are
sufficient to satisfy its principal and interest obligations, its
debtholders will be unwilling to revise business strategy in a way
that increases the likelihood that they will not recover their
principal and interest—no matter how much additional profit the
firm may be expected to make as a result of such revisions.
Safeguards attending debtholders’ interests are designed to
protect the fixed returns they are due, without excessively
interfering with the aggregate interests of the firm. First,
debtholders may enjoy security interests in the firm’s assets.
These security interests provide collateral in case the firm’s
income is insufficient to satisfy principal34 or interest
obligations.35 So long as the value of the collateral remains above
the amount due on the loan, the creditor does not incur the
debtor’s default risk.36
Second, debt contracts frequently include covenants. Some
covenants require the firm to meet or maintain accounting ratios
or other performance targets.37 Other covenants prohibit the
firm from selling its operating assets, incurring additional debt,
or otherwise materially changing its business or financial

33
Interest payments need not be fixed. For example, the interest due on a bond
may vary with the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”), which is the rate that
banks offer when making loans to other banks. See What’s in a Number? Donald
MacKenzie on the Importance of Libor, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Sept. 25, 2008, at 11.
Whether an instrument will be treated as debt by the tax authority, however, does
partly turn on the determinant of interest payments. See Fin Hay Realty Co., 398
F.2d at 697.
34
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006) (providing secured status to lienholders and
those holding setoff rights); id. § 725 (providing for the distribution of property
subject to a lien to the lienholder before any other distribution of the estate’s
property takes place).
35
See id. § 506(b) (providing for limited satisfaction of postpetition interest from
the security interest).
36
The law of secured transactions is concerned with how and when security
interests in collateral are established. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2010) (discussing subject
matter of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code); see also Ronald J. Mann,
Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 220
(1997) (reporting empirical findings on debtor’s recourse to their rights to liquidate
collateral).
37
See, e.g., Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65–
66 (D.D.C. 2008) (tripping of performance based covenants put Iridium World
Communications into default).
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structure.38 If the debtor breaches a covenant, the creditor
usually has the right to accelerate repayment.39 Covenants
provide both flexibility and deterrence for the benefit of
creditors.40 Performance based covenants provide creditors with
early warning that the debtor is approaching an area where
shareholders cease to bear the downside.41 When covenants are
tripped, the threat of acceleration allows the creditor to
renegotiate the instrument’s terms ex post rather than having to
attempt to provide for all contingencies ex ante.42 Covenants that
prevent substantial changes in the firm’s operations such as
mergers, spin-offs, and entry into new lines of business help
ensure that the risk profile of a firm is not radically altered postissuance. Otherwise, a workaday issuer could transform into a
tech startup with proceeds from creditors who had purchased the
debt at an interest rate calibrated for the more sober business.
In short, covenants are designed to safeguard debtholders from
management without involving them in management.

38
See William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics
and Law, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 39,
49–62 (2006) (providing an overview of commonly used debt covenants).
39
As an alternative to accelerating the principal, tripping a covenant may
increase the interest rate. See Vipal Monga, Return of the Covenants, THE DEAL,
Feb. 23, 2009, at 4:21 (“Covenants can take many forms, but they are essentially
restrictive clauses in loan agreements that force borrowers to meet specific
benchmarks or keep them from incurring debt beyond a set level.”).
40
See Harry DeAngelo et al., Asset Liquidity, Debt Covenants, and Managerial
Discretion in Financial Distress: The Collapse of L.A. Gear, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5
(2002) (describing the use of debt covenants in a case study of the financial distress
of L.A. Gear and concluding that “debt covenants sometimes constrain managerial
discretion more effectively than does the pressure to meet cash interest obligations”).
41
See, e.g., VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 628 (3d Cir. 2007)
(providing an example of an earnings based covenant). See generally Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006).
42
See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 17–18 (Wiley 2000)
(describing the ability of distressed investors to use the Bankruptcy Code’s voting
rules to achieve control positions—known as “negative control”—in debtors); Alex
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 601, 654–55 (2007) (observing that lenders frequently renegotiate strict
covenants); Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure:
An Empirical Investigation 23 (Aug. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962131 (providing empirical
evidence showing that creditors use covenant violation to reduce firms’ debt load).
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Third and fourth, debtholders benefit from the right to
transfer their instruments to other investors and from fiduciary
rights.43 Neither right is unique to debtholders and both will be
discussed at length in the following Subpart on shareholders.44
B.

The Economic and Control Rights of Typical Shareholders

Common shares entitle their holders to the “residual” of a
firm or those assets that remain after all other interest holders
have been satisfied. The residual is composed of the sum of the
firm’s proceeds from equity issuances and net income.45 The
residual is reduced to the extent it is distributed.46 A firm’s net
income is the difference between its gross income and expenses.
Gross income includes, for example, revenues a firm receives
from selling its inventory or interest it is paid on bonds it holds.
Expenses include, for example, the costs of acquiring the
inventory sold, rent for the store space, and wages paid to
employees. From the perspective of shareholders, expenses also
include interest and taxes due, as these reduce the net income
available to shareholders. It is important to note that current

43
See VFB, 482 F.3d at 635–36 (discussing directors’ duty of loyalty to creditors
where a company is insolvent).
44
For reasons that will be explained in Part II.B.3, debtholders only benefit
from fiduciary rights when the firm enters the zone of insolvency.
45
A well known formulation by Robert Haig and Henry Simons defines net
income as the algebraic sum of: “(1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption [by the taxpayer] and (2) the change in the value of the [taxpayer’s]
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question.”
See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION 50 (photo reprint 1980) (1938). This definition is inadequate
because not all value is protected by legal rights, and moreover, as every lawyer
knows, the exact scope of legal rights is difficult to determine precisely. See, e.g.,
Chris William Sanchirico, Progressivity and Potential Income: Measuring the Effect
of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax Progressivity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1551,
1551 (2008) (explaining that changes in the composition of off-market labor supply
during the 1990s were sufficient to countervail progressive amendments of the Tax
Code); see also Raskolnikov, supra note 42, at 602 (2007) (explaining how norms are
relied on in structuring transactions to reduce tax liability).
46
For example, if a firm is initially capitalized through an equity issuance of
$50, operates for a year incurring a net loss of $30, makes net income of $50 in the
second year, and breaks even in the third year, declaring dividends of $40, the
residual of the firm will be $50 at the outset of year one, $20 at the end of year one,
$70 at the end of year two, and $30 at the end of year three.
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retained earnings do not fully measure a common shareholder’s
economic interest in the firm, as shares also entitle their holders
to future net income.
Financial statements help investors track and compare
financial positions of firms.47 To assist comparison, accountants
have developed rules for when income and expenses are
recognized and how they are measured.48 For example, generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) govern49 how firms
report their condition in financial statements disclosed pursuant
to the Securities Act of 193350 and the Exchange Act of 1934.51
Financial statements do not fully reflect the value of
shareholders’ equity because they only reflect past and present
net income.
When a firm has insufficient cash to pay its expenses, the
firm becomes insolvent and the interests of common shareholders
become extinguished.52 Because shareholders receive as little if

47
See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 927, 974 (2007) (“The primary aim of financial accounting is to
provide relevant, reliable, consistent and comparable financial information to the
capital markets in order to ensure efficient allocation of resources.”).
48
See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts About FASB,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2010) (“Such standards are important to the efficient functioning of the
economy because decisions about the allocation of resources rely heavily on credible,
concise, and understandable financial information.”).
49
See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006); id. § 78m(b)(1); see also The Roles of the SEC
and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief
Accountant,
U.S.
Securities
&
Exchange
Comm.),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051402tsrkh.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
50
See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).
51
See id. § 78m(b)(1).
52
It is useful to distinguish financial from economic insolvency. See BARRY E.
ADLER ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 26–27 (4th ed.
2007); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic)
Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53
J. FIN. 1443, 1444–45 (1998) (discussing measurement difficulty in distinguishing
financial from economic distress). Financial insolvency describes a firm that meets
distress solely because claims become due sooner than cash becomes available to
meet them; in other words, a firm that is distressed because of the timing rather
than the amount of its cash flow. Id. at 1445. Economic insolvency describes a firm
that is distressed because its revenues will not cover its costs. Id. at 1444–45. When
a firm faces financial, rather than economic, insolvency, its shareholders may retain
an interest in the residual. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2006) (codifying chapter 7
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for economic insolvency), with id. §§ 1101–
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the firm has not a cent as they do if the firm has exactly enough
to satisfy all debtholders, they may be overly willing to risk bad
making it worse—whereas debtholders are too willing to satisfy
themselves with good instead of better. Collateral, covenants,
and the other safeguards discussed in the preceeding Subpart53
limit these shareholder inclinations but do not affirmatively
prescribe firm strategy. While they ensure that debtholders’
fixed returns are not unreasonably endangered for the benefit of
shareholders, they allow the firm to pursue shareholders’
interest, which generally consists of maximizing the residual.
This Subpart discusses safeguards that ensure that management
does pursue their interests. These safeguards include the right
to vote, the right to be informed, the right to transfer shares, as
well as fiduciaries’ duties to the shareholders.
1.

Shareholder Democracy

Governance in corporations takes the form of a
constitutional, representative democracy.54
Incorporation
requires the filing of a certificate of incorporation, or analogous
charter document, with an officer of a state. The certificate of
incorporation may specify features of corporate governance, such
as the number of initial directors, the percentage of outstanding
shares required for a quorum at a meeting of shareholders or
directors, and whether a supermajority is required for
shareholder or director actions.55 The certificate of incorporation
may also delegate the determination of these features to the
corporate bylaws, which differ from the certificate in several

174 (codifying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for reorganization
from financial insolvency).
53
See supra Part I.A.
54
Voting rights attending share ownership have evolved over the course of the
twentieth century from statutorily imposed egalitarianism, which required each
share to confer one and only one vote on its holder, to the current system, which
allows firms to issue classes of shares with distinct voting power. See LOUIS LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, 4 SECURITIES REGULATION 1831–49 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the
evolution of restrictions on shareholder disenfranchisement); see also David L.
Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of
‘One Share, One Vote,’ 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (1970) (“By the end of the nineteenth
century, then, statutory restrictions on the rule of one vote per share in business
corporations had virtually disappeared, and it is now unusual to find a statutory
reference to any formula other than one vote per share.”).
55
The bylaws may also impose other restrictions. See, e.g., Brown v. Jacobs, 29
F.2d 202, 202 (4th Cir. 1928) (enforcing restriction on executive compensation).
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important respects.56 First, the bylaws are a contract between
shareholders, whereas the certificate is a contract with the state.
Second, the bylaws may be amended by the board of directors,
whereas the certificate can only be amended with shareholder
approval.
Though governance features may vary across
corporations, and some corporations may fix features of
governance permanently or subject only to amendment by
shareholder supermajority, the separation of ownership and
control is ubiquitous.57
Shareholders do not themselves
ordinarily manage operations.58 In fact, they do not even manage
those who manage operations. Instead, officers of the company
make business decisions, and directors reward or terminate
officers based presumably in part on the results of those
decisions. Excepting requirements for shareholder approval of
certain extraordinary actions such as mergers, liquidations, and
sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets,59
shareholders influence the acts of the corporation only indirectly,
through electing directors to represent their interests.60
56
See Carr v. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191, 191 (1845) (“It is a well settled
principle of law, that the by-laws of a corporation must not be repugnant to its
charter; the charter creates an artificial being, defines its powers, designates the
purposes of its institution, and points out its mode of action. It is the fundamental
law of the corporation, and is as a constitution to the body acting under and by it.”).
57
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 41, at 1213–14 (“Shareholders, as
residual claimants, serve as good proxies for all investors when the business is flush.
They bear both the costs and benefits of the enterprise, but they do not actually
control the day-to-day affairs of the business, ceding decision making over all but a
handful of matters to directors and officers.”). Close corporations pose the exception
to this general rule, allowing shareholders to manage the business of the corporation
instead of the board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2010).
58
See, e.g., Trethewey v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 136 P.2d 999, 1010 (Wash.
1943) (“The power of management of the corporate affairs and the power to contract
so as to bind the corporation is vested primarily in the board of directors and not in
the stockholders; the principal rights of the latter, in ordinary business or trading
corporations, are to attend and vote at corporate meetings, to pass and amend bylaws, to elect directors, to participate in dividends and profits, and to receive their
proportionate shares of the corporate property or its proceeds upon dissolution and
winding up of the corporation after payment of its debts.”).
59
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253, 271, 275 (2010) (setting forth
shareholder approval requirements to carry out a merger, asset sale, and liquidation
of a Delaware corporation, respectively).
60
See id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”);
Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 898 (Del. Ch. 1956) (holding that Delaware
corporate law “does not permit actions or agreements by stockholders which would
take all power from the board to handle matters of substantial management policy”),
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The power of shareholder democracy to discipline
management weakens as share ownership becomes more diffuse.
As the shareholder’s proportionate ownership of the company
shrinks, both the cost to the shareholder of allowing ineffective
management and the voting power of the shareholder to prevent
it diminish.
Various bodies of law reinforce shareholder
democracy in broadly held corporations.
Proxy rules
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) under the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)
restrict manipulation of shareholder voting by, for example,
preventing the bundling of several proposals to force
shareholders to approve the bad with the good.61 Securities
exchanges and other markets qualifying as Self Regulating
Organizations (“SROs”) under the Exchange Act impose
restrictions on listed issuers.
These restrictions prop up
shareholder democracy by, for example, requiring shareholder
approval of additional equity compensation to management so as
to prevent dilution of shareholder interests. Tax law also plays a
role in encouraging shareholder democracy. For example, section
280G of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Tax Code”) imposes an
excise tax on certain severance payments to management in
excess of a statutory threshold unless the payment is
unanimously approved by shareholders.62
rev’d on other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957); Joseph Greenspon’s Sons Iron &
Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 156 A. 350, 351–52 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931) (holding
that control of the company is vested in a company’s board of directors, which
delegates its powers to officers); Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921)
(holding that duties of directors “relate to supervision, direction and control, the
details of the business being delegated to inferior officers, agents and employees”),
aff’d, 118 A.1 (Del. 1922). For a proposal to expand policy decisions subject to
shareholder democracy, responses to that proposal and its defense, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response,
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006).
61
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–ll (2006) (codifying the Exchange Act); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2010); see also Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 134–35
(2d Cir. 1999).
62
While corporate law allows the attachment of voting rights to instruments
other than common shares, in practice voting is restricted to shareholders. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 29, at 399 (“Almost all shares have one vote, and
only shares possess votes.”). Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have explained
this practice as a reflection of the shareholders’ incentives as residual claimants:
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Disclosure

Enfranchisement without more does not guarantee
responsible governance.
For democratic feedback to steer
management in the right direction, shareholders must be able to
assess managerial performance. Shareholders’ rights to be
informed of firm performance serve as an essential complement
to voting rights. These rights have many sources. State law
generally provides “inspection rights,” which require corporations
to make available firm financial information at shareholder
request.63 A firm that has registered with the SEC either
because it publicly issued securities or because its securities are
held sufficiently broadly must comply with additional Exchange
Act disclosure requirements, which include periodic reporting of
the firm’s financial position, risks the firm faces in running its
business, and performance relative to close competitors.64 In
addition, the proxy statement of a registered firm must include
details on directors’ and officers’ compensation, ostensibly to
inform shareholders how much they are paying for the firm’s

The firm should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and
costs are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, expect the
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on
the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security)
from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders receive most of the
marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have
the right incentives to exercise discretion.
Id. at 403. Whether shareholders truly are sole residual claimants will be addressed
in Part II, below.
63
The right of inspection has both common law and statutory sources. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010) (granting inspection rights to shareholders of
Delaware corporations); 5A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2239 (West rev. vol. 2004)
(“The right of the shareholder at common law extends to all the books, papers,
records, federal reports, and other data of the corporation respecting assets,
liabilities, contracts, operations and practices, including correspondence between the
controlling officers relating to the internal affairs of the corporation.”); id.
(discussing statutory right, which in “a majority of . . . jurisdictions . . . extends to
books and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders”). The business
judgment rule, which is discussed subsequently, does not protect directors who fail
to disclose information to the shareholders that is necessary to the latter’s “informed
choice on a matter of fundamental corporate importance.” In re Anderson, Clayton
S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986). In some states, the certificate of
incorporation may confer upon debt holders the same rights enjoyed by
shareholders, including inspection rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221
(2010).
64
See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 545–78 (6th ed. 2009).
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performance.65 The rules of specific exchanges further expand
shareholder access to information. For example, Rule 15c2-11 of
the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to provide financial
information on unlisted issuers of securities they mediate,66 thus
ensuring that even a nonregistered firm’s financials will be
available by a route other than state corporate law.67
3.

Fiduciary Duties

In addition to the private deterrence imposed by shareholder
democracy, directors and management are subject to civil
liability as shareholders’ fiduciaries.68 There are two qualities to
fear in a caretaker—evil and stupidity—either one of which may
precipitate abusive decisions. Fiduciary duties on their face offer
protection against both evil and stupidity on the part of directors
and management. Though the formulation varies across states,
management and directors are generally obligated to “perform
[their] duties . . . in good faith and with that degree of care which
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances” and to do so in a manner reasonably
believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.69 Evil
violates the obligation to act in good faith and in a manner
reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.
65
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856 (2d Cir. 1968) (approving
rescission of options granted to management where material facts were not
disclosed).
66
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11(a) (2010).
67
Presumably if a purchaser acquires an instrument directly from the issuer
without intermediation, the purchaser can request desired information from the
issuer as part of the same transaction.
68
Like debt covenants, fiduciary duties prevent mismanagement rather than
ensure managerial excellence. To borrow an analogy from horse racing, both
fiduciary duties and debt covenants form rails. They prevent the horses from
wandering into the center of the track to graze on the lush grass—but they do not
ensure that the horses give their all to the race. This similarity should not obscure
the many distinctions between debt covenants and fiduciary duties. Debt covenants
and fiduciary duties differ in origin, specificity, and obligated parties. The former are
based in private law, take the form of rules, and obligate the firm vis-à-vis the
creditor. The latter are based in public law, take the form of standards, and obligate
directors and officers to the firm.
69
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2010) (specifying duties of
directors); see 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1029 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (introducing duty
of care and distinguishing it from duty of loyalty); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30
(2002) (requiring each director to act “in good faith” and “in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”).
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Stupidity would violate the statutory obligation of due care but
for the court-created business judgment rule, which excuses
decisions that yield poor results provided they are preceded with
adequate procedure.70
Several justifications have been offered for declawing the
obligation of due care, among them the dangers of judging
business decisions in hindsight and the ability of shareholders
who are dissatisfied with the quality of management to leave the
firm.71
The first explanation fails to explain courts’
unembarrassed assessment of business decisions on their
economic merits in other contexts. In the tax context, for
example, the economic substance doctrine discussed in Part II.F
asks whether a transaction poses “a reasonable possibility of
[pretax] profit” when determining whether its form would be
respected or whether the form would be disregarded and less
favorable tax treatment accorded.72 As another example, in the
antitrust context, courts ask whether a decision not to deal with
a competitor was precipitated by anticompetitive motives or
legitimate business purpose.73 A justification of the business
judgment rule as judicious modesty fails to account for the
selective practice of such modesty. The second explanation is
also, without more, unsatisfying. It applies equally to the duty of
good faith: if a shareholder dislikes a self-dealing manager, the
shareholder is as free to sell as if she dislikes a foolish one.
Considering fiduciary duties as a complement to shareholder
democracy, however, helps explain why courts have trimmed the
duty of due care but not the duty of good faith. A fiduciary who
intentionally seeks to benefit himself at the expense of the firm is

70

See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (limiting judicial analysis
of due care to the procedure by which a decision was made rather than the substance
of the decision).
71
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (1981)
(discussing the business judgment rule as embodying a “policy of judicial restraint”);
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 473 (2004);
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, FED.
RES. BD., N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 93 (“Courts have long recognized the
risks associated with judging directors’ decisions retrospectively . . . [and] responded
by developing what is known as the Business Judgment Rule.”).
72
See supra Part II.F.
73
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–09
(1985) (requiring inquiry into whether decision not to cooperate with a rival was
efficient when assessing whether such decision was anti-competitive).
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likelier to manipulate the disclosure process upon which
departure and deterrence through shareholder democracy are
predicated.
A fool fiduciary is likelier to leave footprints
revealing his stumbles, especially after being forced down a
procedural path.74
In a typical corporation and most of the time, fiduciary
duties protect solely the shareholders. There are, however,
exceptions in which fiduciaries are duty-bound to multiple
stakeholders simultaneously. For example, officers and directors
of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) owe a duty of care to the bank, which the FDIC may
enforce.75 Outside the banking industry, fiduciary duties expand
to protect debtholders when a firm nears the zone of insolvency.76
Moreover, shareholders themselves do not necessarily have the
same interests or even rights, as some may be investing for the
long term and others for the short term, or they may simply be
holding distinct classes of shares with distinct voting or transfer
rights.
4.

Market for Control

While dispersed shareholders may be too light a rider to spur
management to excellence, and fiduciary duties do nothing to
restrict management from shabby decisions, management in a
broadly held corporation may not be safe to remain in a state of
perfectly unproductive repose.77 When management does less

74
It is also worth noting that the deterrence effect of shareholder democracy
diminishes during the fiduciary’s final term. Being fired becomes less of a threat to
an officer who plans to retire anyway. The duty of good faith helps guard against
otherwise rational self-dealing by officers in their last term, as it forces
disgorgement of any gains achieved thereby. This second reason for the selective
reduction of fiduciary duties is not as satisfying as the first because it does not
consider that a fiduciary may allow his laziness to triumph in the final term as
easily as his venality.
75
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2006); Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213,
216 (1997); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824–25 (N.J. 1981).
76
While mismanagement in a firm with substantial residual hurts only the
shareholders, as the residual evaporates, debtholders become exposed to additional
losses. Thus while the occasions when debtholders formally enjoy fiduciary rights
may be rare, positively, debtholders may enjoy such rights much of the time when
they would matter.
77
See Manne, supra note 13 (offering seminal formulation of the market for
corporate control); Randall Morck et al., Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and
Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101
(Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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than it can with a firm’s assets, it faces the threat that the share
price becomes sufficiently depressed to make it worthwhile for a
concentrated owner to emerge. A third party with sufficient cash
and certainty in the potential of the firm may buy a sufficient
number of the shares from their dispersed holders to gain
effective voting control over the board of directors, elect its own
representatives to it, and have them install harder working
management that better takes advantage of the firm’s capacity.78
The purchase price offered to the dispersed shareholders may
reflect a “control premium,” which shares the benefit of
anticipated improvements in the firm’s performance with
incumbent shareholders. The more incumbent management
mismanages the firm, the cheaper it becomes for a third party to
offer a substantial premium to purchase control of the firm.79
This corrective force is dubbed the “market for control” and rests
on shareholders’ right to transfer their shares. Without that
right, the threat of a concentrated owner emerging to clean house
would not be credible.80
5.

Market for Management

Like the market for control, the market for management
does not refer to a distinct shareholder right but rather to a force
that derives from a legal right and encourages managerial
excellence. The predicate right to the market for control is the
shareholder’s vote, especially as it applies to executive
compensation. As mentioned above, layers of state, federal,
agency, and SRO law enhance shareholder power as voters on
issues of executive compensation.81 Well-designed executive
compensation packages align the interests of management with
the interests of shareholders. For instance, by granting officers

78

See Manne, supra note 13, at 112–14.
The extent to which the market for control disciplines management has been
the subject of academic debate. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The
Efficiency Argument, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 69, 80 (1988) (“In theory, tender offer
takeovers provide a significant corrective against managerial departures from profit
maximization. Careful scrutiny of the available evidence[, however,] leads to a more
skeptical assessment.”).
80
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(d) (2010) (enumerating per se reasonable
purposes for restrictions on the transfer of securities); ANGELA SCHNEEMAN, THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 286, 288–91 (3d ed.
2002) (discussing permissible restrictions on the alienability of stock).
81
See supra Part I.B.1.
79
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stock in the corporation, the shareholders can ensure that
management will benefit when they do.82
Where the market for control takes place between
shareholders, the market for management is between candidateofficers. The better a candidate believes she would be at the job,
the more she expects to gain from stock based compensation.
Thus, were the firm to run an auction for the executive office
holding the amount of equity compensation constant and
allowing candidates to submit bids reporting the minimum cash
compensation they would be willing to work for, the best
candidate83 would take the lowest amount of cash compensation.
To the extent that contests among candidates for executive
positions follow this procedure, not only is the quality of the
candidates maximized, but the amount of cash expended by the
firm is minimized. This is the ex ante benefit of the market for
management. The firm continues to benefit from the market ex
post as the executive’s well-being is tied to that of shareholders
through the equity component of her compensation.

82
Such grants are not without downsides. First, they dilute the nonofficer
shareholders, who now must share the residual with the officers. When equity
grants substitute for cash compensation, the dilution is offset by the savings the firm
realizes on executives’ salaries. Second, awarding an executive a large block of stock
may discourage the executive from bold but efficient strategies because the block
may represent a very large portion of the executive’s net wealth. To offset this
deterrent to productive risk taking, firms may award executives out of the money
options, which only acquire value when the firm surprises investors’ expectations.
Finally, equity compensation may increase incentives for management to engage in
earnings management. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where
We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How To Fix Them 47
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; see also Daniel B. Bergstresser &
Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from the
1990s, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 521–24 (2006) (showing evidence that earnings
management increases with equity compensation).
83
This assumes that candidates could judge their own quality and have equal
opportunity costs. If they cannot judge their quality, the hired officer may suffer
from the winner’s curse, and the company may suffer from an arrogant fool. See J. B.
Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33, 33–35
(2002) (summarizing literature on optimism and exploring its implications for
managerial decisionmaking). If candidates do not share the same alternatives, then
a lower cash bid may be motivated by the absence of anything better rather than
from an ability to more effectively exploit firm resources.
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II. THE TAX AUTHORITY AS EQUITY HOLDER
The economic interest the tax authority has in a firm is
similar but not identical to that of the shareholder.84 To
understand the extent of overlap between shareholders’ and the
tax authority’s interests, it bears taking a look at the role and
principles of tax accounting. Whereas accounting serves merely
to inform shareholders of the firm’s financial position, accounting
wholly determines how much the tax authority receives. A firm’s
tax liability is calculated by applying a progressive schedule of
rates to its positive taxable income and then subtracting certain
credits.85 Taxable income is arrived at by reducing the firm’s
gross income by various expenses, such as interest payments to
debtholders.86
At this level of generality, taxable income
represents a quantity indistinct from net income under GAAP.
Tax and GAAP measures of gross income and expenses,
however, do differ.87 Whereas GAAP seek to assess a firm’s
financial position, tax accounting also serves regulatory goals,
which occasionally conflict with accurate reporting of income.88
For example, interest payments from municipal bonds are not
included in taxable income. This is not an oversight by tax
accountants. Rather, the omission is designed to allow the
federal government to subsidize local governments without
having to go through the additional steps of raising tax revenues
at the federal level and then redistributing them to the local
level.89 As an example of another difference, revenues and
expenses are generally recognized by tax accounting closer to the
time at which they resolve into cash inflows and outflows. This
84

See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 1–2.
See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 14–23
(7th ed. 2008) (describing the process of calculating a corporation’s tax liability,
including any under the alternative minimum tax).
86
Id. at 132–34 (explaining the distinct tax treatment of equity and debt and
discussing some of the factors used to determine whether an instrument is equity or
debt).
87
See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 927, 971–1008 (2007) (discussing implications of conforming tax to
GAAP accounting); see also Robert Willens, Defining and Dealing with a Deferred
Tax Asset, 27 TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REP. 1224 (2008).
88
See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (discussing
difference in purpose of tax and GAAP accounting).
89
See Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for
State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 150–52 (1998) (criticizing the subsidy as
inefficient and inequitable and proposing an alternative means for subsidizing state
spending on public goods).
85
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difference in timing avoids potential liquidity costs that could be
imposed on firms if they had to service tax liability based on
gains in the value of assets difficult to convert to cash.90 The
difference in timing also extends the lag between accounting and
reality.91 While GAAP itself does not perfectly assess a firm’s net
income, these departures from GAAP further distort its
measure.92
The differences in measurement between tax accounting and
whatever measure shareholders use to gauge their own wellbeing qua shareholders is the practical justification for this
Article because it is these differences that necessitate granting
the tax authority its own control rights.93 To the extent that
maximizing the residual available to common shareholders also
maximizes taxable income, assertive shareholders incidentally
safeguard the tax authority’s interest.94
90

See Wolfgang Schön, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Odd Couple: A
Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV. 111, 133–39
(2005) (discussing liquidity impact of tax accounting as a motivation for the
disparities between tax and GAAP accounting).
91
See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir.
2006) (discussing a transaction that accelerated the recognition of contingent
liabilities despite the general “prohibition against claiming a deduction in a given
tax year for an estimate of liabilities that have not become fixed by the end of that
year”).
92
Acknowledging that these differences should not obscure pervasive
similarities between GAAP and tax accounting, just as failures of GAAP to provide
omniscient accounts of firms do not rebut its utility.
93
Michelle Hanlon and Terry Shevlin defend the nonconformity of tax and
GAAP accounting based on similar observations. See Michelle Hanlon & Terry
Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues, in
19 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 101, 103–04 (James Poterba ed., 2005). If a single
measure is adopted for calculating book and tax income, then either the regulatory
goals of the tax system will be compromised or the informational content of financial
statements will be limited to that provided by tax accounting. Hanlon and Shevlin
review evidence of the relative informational paucity of tax accounting, arguing that
book tax conformity will either blunt the regulatory force of the Tax Code or blind
investors. Id. at 127 nn.1, 5, 7.
94
Shareholders are further incented to pursue the interests of the tax authority
through the tax authority’s priority in bankruptcy. While the tax authority receives
only a percentage of net income while the firm is solvent, a bankrupt firm must pay
the tax authority in full before a shareholder receives a penny.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring that unsecured creditors are paid in full
before junior creditors receive distributions pursuant to a chapter 11 plan); id.
§ 507(a) (granting, second, priority unsecured status—or administrative priority—to
tax liability incurred post petition and, eighth priority unsecured status to tax
liability incurred in the three years ending with the date of petition); see in re
Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 116 F.3d 1391, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that tax
liability for income earned post-petition are afforded administrative priority,
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Assertive shareholders pose a threat to the tax authority’s
interests when an activity that maximizes pretax income does
not maximize after-tax income.95 To understand why, it is
sufficient to note that tax operates in reverse of tort. Whereas
tort forces internalization of negative externalities, tax forces the
externalization of positive internalities. Within a tax system,
those engaging in productive economic activity internalize only a
portion—after-tax income—of the market value of their output—
pretax income. The balance is transferred to the state for the
public wealth. When externalities are not internalized, social
welfare may be lost as private actors maximize private gain.
Just as, absent nuisance law, a factory may pollute though its
profits do not exceed the environmental costs, absent control
rights for the tax authority, shareholders may sacrifice tax
receipts for increases in their after-tax income.
The choice of behaviors that increase after-tax income at the
expense of pretax income is not necessarily troubling.96 Tax
accounting has regulatory goals besides measuring income, and
many of these include encouraging (or discouraging) behaviors
favored (or disfavored) by Congress, which again are assumed to
be those with relatively higher positive (or negative)
externalities. Examples include the favorable treatment of
income from investment and patent production,97 mortgage and
tuition interest deductions,98 and unfavorable treatment of
income and loss—-ordinary income, capital loss—on disposition
of land that was once wetland.99 Like other statutes, however,
the Tax Code is drafted by people who cannot predict all
whereas tax on income earned prepetition and taxes for the three taxable years
preceding petition are afforded seventh—now eighth—priority).
95
See Schlunk, supra note 4, at 7.
96
See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705, 711–13 (1970) (criticizing use of Tax Code to implement social programs
as nontransparent).
97
See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interest in Private Equity, 94
VA. L. REV. 715, 743–44 n.70 (2008).
98
See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 500–03 (15th ed. 2009) (discussing deductibility of qualified residence
interest, interest from home equity indebtedness, and interest on qualified
educational loans as well as general nondeductibility of personal expenses).
99
I.R.C. § 1257(a)–(b) (2006) (providing that gain from the disposition of such
land will be treated as ordinary gain and thus subject to higher tax rates, while loss
from the disposition of such land will be treated as capital loss and thus offsets
income that would be taxed at lower tax rates).
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instances in which it will be applied. As a result, favorable rates
may be inadvertently granted.100 If a corporation responds to a
change in a tax rate, it does so to maximize its private income. If
before an increase in an effective tax rate, the corporation
pursued Project A and afterwards it chose to pursue Project B,
that indicates that the tax rate reduced the relative private
income from Project A. From a normative perspective, if the
increase in positive externality from the firm’s pursuit of Project
B is not worth the decrease in private income, then the tax rate is
socially inefficient.101
From an engineering perspective—a
perspective that seeks to implement congressional will whatever
it may be—a response to the differential tax rate is only
undesirable if it was unintended by Congress. Either view
requires the control rights granted to the tax authority to be
sufficiently flexible to distinguish between exploitative and
desirable responses to tax incentives. Facially pro-tax authority
designs that maximize pretax income may be inadvisable if they
sufficiently reduce intended incentives.102 On the other hand,
designs that allow private interest holders to structure the firm’s
affairs exclusively to reduce tax liability will result in social costs
as firms sacrifice pretax for after-tax income.103
Acknowledging this inherent tension, the rest of this Part
compares control rights typically enjoyed by common
shareholders with those protecting the tax authority. The
contrast hopes to be productive by bringing alternative designs
100
For example, a poorly drafted tax credit meant to incent a shift from gasoline
to alternative fuels allows companies whose production process already relies on
alternative fuels to qualify for the credit by adding fossil fuels. See Bob Ivry &
Christopher Donville, Black Liquor Tax Boondoggle May Net Billions for
Papermakers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2009), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=abDjfGgdumh4.
101
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 53 (Comm. Print 2008) (explaining the efficiency
concept).
102
See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215,
224 (2002) (“[I]f Congress intends to subsidize or penalize a particular activity
through the tax system, changes in behavior because of the tax may be desirable.”).
103
See id. (“Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the
same problem—the changed behavior imposes costs on others that the person does
not take into account.”). The costs to the tax authority of administering the
safeguard and to the taxpayer of complying with it should be included when
evaluating the desirability of adding the safeguard. See Edgar K. Browning, The
Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 84 J. POL. ECON. 283, 294–95 (1976) (explaining why
the costs of administering and complying with a tax have to be included in the
assessment of its desirability).
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into relief. This Part starts by observing that the tax authority
does not participate in shareholder democracy and is not
protected by the markets for control or management. It provides
counterfactual designs of the tax authority’s control rights that
would allow it to vote and benefit from the markets for control
and management.
It then discusses why extending these
protections to the tax authority may be inadvisable. Next, it
explains how the primary substitute for these absent control
rights that is granted to the tax authority—the mandatory
dividend—balances the tax authority’s competing interests as
revenue raiser and regulator. This Part concludes with a
comparison of the disclosure rights and judicial doctrines
protecting shareholders and the tax authority. When proposing
alternative designs, the Article seeks to understand whether
revenue raising and regulatory goals can be preserved while
making the tax system more efficient through reducing the
exploitation of unintended subsidies.104
A.

Shareholder Democracy

A basic difference between shareholders and the tax
authority is that only the former participate in firm governance.
This need not be the case.105 Before considering alternatives, a
basic constraint on the efficacy of allowing the tax authority
board representation should be considered.
Representative
democracy has a winner take all property that leaves government
exclusively to the representatives of the majority. Where two
well-defined factions participate in an election, the majority will
win and need not make concessions to the minority. On first
pass, injection of the tax authority into corporate governance will

104
Tax policy has goals besides efficiency—including equity. Concerns of equity
will be ignored by this Article, in part because it concerns the treatment of
corporations rather than people.
105
Like any change contemplated in this Article, this one may be impractical
politically due to, for example, cultural antipathy to government participation in the
affairs of corporations. Political barriers to revising the protections currently
afforded to the tax authority will not be discussed. Expansions of control rights may
also be objected to as subversions of the constitutional division of power between
state and federal government, which allocates regulation of corporations to states.
But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585 n.29 (2005) (“There is no plausible
constitutional argument that Congress would not have the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a national corporate law.”).
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either accomplish nothing or disenfranchise shareholders.106 If
shareholders are allowed a majority of board seats, the directors
appointed by the tax authority act as little more than
observers.107 If, on the other hand, the tax authority is allowed to
control a majority of the board, shareholders are denied their
primary safeguard, thus discouraging investment. But grace and
devils both dwell in implementation details. For example, rather
than voting in the general election for directors, the tax authority
could be allowed to appoint a representative to the board with
veto power over any resolution that sought to exploit an
unintended rate differential. Generally, this tax director would
not take part in the actions of a board. To the extent, however,
that a board action exploited what was, in the tax director’s
judgment, an unintentional rate differential, she would be able to
veto such action or condition its validity on consent to the less
favorable treatment.108
106
This is a grossly oversimplified model of board behavior. For more nuanced
treatment, see generally JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR
POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989); Gerald F.
Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997); Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An
Examination of the Relation Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large
American Corporations, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 426 (1983).
107
Granting the tax authority observers on boards may result in certain
benefits. To the extent tax observers did not push forthright deliberation outside the
boardroom, they could inform subsequent assessments of board actions. As Part II.F
discusses in more detail, anti-avoidance doctrines may disqualify taxpayers from
favorable tax treatment where their actions were motivated by tax minimization.
The inquiry into motive, however, suffers from limited information and hindsight
bias. A competent attorney can sterilize the minutes and agreements that document
a business decision to ensure they do not evidence improper motives. Without
dependable memorialization of the decisionmaking process, a court may judge the
motives for a decision by its results. A business decision that failed to pan out but
generated tax savings may be attacked as impermissible tax avoidance. Tax
observers can provide courts with a disinterested first hand account of the
deliberative process behind business decisions, increasing accuracy and potentially
enabling broader application of anti-avoidance doctrines.
108
As an optional complement to the veto power, the representative’s accession
to board actions could insulate their results from ex post challenges by the IRS. The
desirability of this alternative could be assessed based on the usual tradeoffs
between judges and umpires. Judicial adjudication, being based on the categories
established by sources of law including precedent, has the benefits of consistency
and the costs of over and underinclusiveness. The accumulation of precedent tends
to produce less uncertainty generally, but in any one case, subjects the regulated
party to uncertainty for a longer period of time as disposition of the party’s rights
will generally follow its business decision and may even last beyond the original
determination by the agency, district court or even court of appeals as judicial
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Extending representation in corporate governance to the tax
authority would have to overcome a significant practical hurdle.
There are over 1.2 million corporations in the United States.109
Finding one qualified tax director for each of them may demand
more qualified appointees than are plausibly available, even if
appointees serve on multiple boards.110 Nor would tax directors
be able to substitute for regular directors provided that their
decisionmaking role was limited to situations where the board’s
act would exploit an unintended rate differential.111 That said,
these practical concerns could be addressed by deploying the
right selectively. For example, a tax director could be appointed
to the board of each of the Fortune 500 companies. In addition

review takes its course. In our present system—firms may reference the law the
Treasury or judges will apply when auditing or adjudicating a challenge to the audit
when designing business strategy. On the other hand, the present system exposes
firms to risk of audit and adverse judicial determination well after a board adopts a
business strategy. See, e.g., Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock
Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d 919, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (rejecting the trial court’s
conclusion that a contract was unenforceable because it accomplished tax
avoidance), aff’d on other grounds, 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009). An umpire based
system lacks the consistency and ex ante predictability of accumulating predent but
compensates with finality, as it insulates business decisions approved by tax
directors from further scrutiny. An umpire based system also has the benefit that
the authority evaluating a decision is located in the same place and time as the
decision makers, so that the legal assessment is made with no more and (assuming
communications are not made informally) no less information than that available to
those who had to make the decision.
109
See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN- AND
U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1998–2005 23, 28 (2008) (reporting survey of
corporate tax liability between 1998 and 2005, including the number of U.S.
corporate filers).
110
Moving beyond corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and
other businesses may also engage in exploitation of unintended rate differentials. If
the tax authority’s control rights were to be implemented through participation as a
partner, member, or analog, the demand for eligible directors would be even greater.
111
Potentially, the involvement of tax directors could decrease the Treasury’s
demand for personnel to detect tax evasion and respond to effective tax avoidance.
Moreover, their involvement could decrease the burden on courts that review
transactions after challenge by the IRS. A tax director’s consent or objection to board
action could be granted presumptive validity. Acknowledging these potential
savings, it remains difficult to imagine how a system of tax directors could be
implemented that would ultimately result in savings of administrative resources—
though such a system may improve other features of the tax regime.
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and/or as an alternative, a thousand corporate taxpayers could be
selected randomly and a tax director installed on each of their
boards.112
Moving beyond more tangible resource constraints, it may be
questioned whether an act that expressly installed government
representatives in corporate governance would expose firm
decisions to political influence to net social detriment. As
discussed further below, safeguards of the tax authority’s
interest as currently implemented are designed to be passive.
Differential tax rates align the self-interest of residual
claimholders with policy goals, effectively subsidizing the cost of
equity capital for favored projects. Rather than installing
government appointees to choose firm policy, the present regime
acts indirectly by supplying the parameters for decisions left to
privately appointed directors and officers. The current regime,
however, is not wholly passive, as the deterrents to tax evasion
and avoidance ultimately rely on the involvement of courts.
Where firms misreport tax attributes or exploit unintended rate
differentials, government representatives do subsequently
disqualify them from the favorable tax rates.113 A system in
which government representatives are exposed to the
deliberations preceding board action and invalidate such actions
at the time they are taken—rather than rely on a mix of
imperfect evidence and hindsight to invalidate actions ex post—
may intrude less and more accurately in private enterprise than
the present system.114 Whether the tax director concept is
adopted or the status quo is maintained, officials selected
through the political process effect the validity and tax treatment

112
All credit for suggesting the use of random sampling to expand the tax
director program is owed to David Weisbach, who suggested it. All discredit is due
entirely to the author of this Article.
113
See, e.g., Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122,
172 (D. Conn. 2004).
114
See supra note 108.
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of board actions.115 The substantive difference between a tax
director and a judge is not apparent and may be narrowed
through design.116
B.

Market for Control

The market for control does not distinctly benefit the tax
authority. In fact, its present incarnation allocates assets to
those who maximize their after-tax returns, thus preferring
owners best able to minimize the tax authority’s share.117
The market for control could be adapted to serve the revenue
raising goals of the tax authority, but the current inalienability
of tax receivables prevents such adaptation.
Unlike a
shareholder, the Treasury cannot sell its interest in a firm.
Thus, parties who are better able to maximize the value of the
tax receivables are prevented from acquiring them. If the
Treasury could sell its rights in firms’ tax receipts to parties who
are better able to increase the value of those rights, co-ownership
of the rights to such receipts and equity would reduce the
externality and the resulting social costs imposed by tax.118
If shareholders had rights to a firm’s tax liability in
proportion to their ownership of the firm’s equity, they would
steer firms to maximize pretax income.
Every dollar of
additional pretax income would benefit such shareholders
equally, whether it were distributed to them on account of their
shares or their rights to tax receipts. Provided proportionate
ownership of shares and tax receipts could be achieved, no
shareholder would benefit from expenses incurred to reduce tax
liability. Proportionate ownership could theoretically evolve from
simply offering the receivables to the market. If the government
were to auction its tax receivables to the highest bidder,
115
In the past, the SEC has signed consent decrees with corporations that
violated federal securities laws, requiring the election of independent directors. See
Chris R. Ottenweller, Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in
Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737, 738 (1976).
116
For example, the political independence of judges may partly be a function of
life tenure. Tax directors could similarly be given life tenure, albeit the companies
they are directors of may have to change over their lifetimes.
117
See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 607–21 (2008) (explaining why share
price reflects after-tax cash flows).
118
See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 561 (1993) (“[If] a single owner
test yields a unique result, then [that result] should be followed by the legal
system.”).
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assuming perfect information and no liquidity constraints, the
receivables would be purchased by the entity able to turn the
highest pretax profit.119 In the absence of liquidity constraints, a
single owner of both the common shares and tax receivables, who
would be positioned to collect the full pretax returns from the
business, would determine the highest bid. Of course, in the real
world, liquidity would constrain potential bidders from collecting
all of the shares and tax receivables of a firm. Moreover,
information is scarce, so there may be few, if any, bidders able to
valuate the pretax potential of a firm—though it is not clear that
the tools to make those valuations are any different from the
tools in use now to valuate firms’ after-tax earnings.
For firms not yet incorporated, an easier alternative exists,
which would not impose the administrative costs of organizing
auctions on the government and be more accommodating to
investors’ liquidity constraints. Corporations could be taxed on
their proceeds from their primary offerings of equity and then
excused from paying corporate taxes.120 The expected value of
the excused taxes would be impounded in the purchase price as
would the social welfare lost to tax avoidance.121 By taxing the
purchase price, the tax authority would be able to share in
income undistorted by tax avoidance.122
An objection to implementing a market for receivables is that
it negates the regulatory power of the Tax Code. As discussed
119

Taxation on projected profits, even if the projection has the benefit of all
available information, will result in overtaxing investors when the firm
underperforms and undertaxing investors when the firm succeeds. See Alan J.
Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 167 (1991).
120
The present regime does not tax corporations on proceeds from offerings. See
25 U.S.C. § 1032 (2006).
121
This assumes that share price reflects discounted after-tax dividends. See
ODIE
ET AL., supra note 117. The projected corporate tax liability would be
B
impounded in the purchase price because the firm’s after-tax retained earnings
would no longer be reduced by taxes on its income. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL.,
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 130–37 (2009) (explaining
that the market price of tax favored productive assets increases until prospective
investors are indifferent between them and their non-favored alternative). In the
absence of corporate taxes, corporations would face no incentive to structure their
activities to reduce such taxes. Instead, corporations would pursue projects that
maximized risk adjusted returns, allowing investors to internalize the deadweight
loss of tax avoidance of the status quo.
122
At the corporate level, this would effectively replace the income tax with a
consumption tax. For a rigorous comparison of income to consumption taxation, see
Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006).
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above, maneuvers that maximize after-tax income at the expense
of pretax income are not necessarily contrary to legislative
intent. Preferential tax rates induce shifts to congressionally
favored forms of enterprise.123 Once the incentive to seek out
preferential rates is removed, the power of the tax system to
motivate legislatively preferred behavior is extinguished. That
said, to the extent a tax regime overemphasizes the regulatory
goals, introducing a partial market for tax receivables—for
example, at a five percent rate on the proceeds—could be
implemented to rebalance it. Some countries have done exactly
this, imposing what is effectively a sales tax on proceeds from
equity offerings.124
If the present system for delivering regulatory subsidies
through the Tax Code was revised to separate them into credits,
that system could then be adapted to decrease the efficiency loss
to unintended subsidies.125
Scholars and regulators have
distinguished between favorable treatment justified by
administrative concerns and favorable treatment that is
predominantly regulatory.126 If the administrative concerns were
reflected in the calculation of taxable income, while regulatory
goals were reflected solely in tax credits that were then
subtracted from the product of the applicable rates and the
taxable income calculated in the first stage, then privatization of
tax liability owed based solely on taxable income would reduce
the deadweight loss from adjustments to administrative
subsidies. Firms would nevertheless remain subject to the
regulatory incentives posed by the tax credits, as those would not
be auctioned off.
123
Like other responses to regulation, these may be normatively desirable if the
aggregate of pre-regulation private income and positive externalities is less than the
aggregate of post-regulation private income and positive externalities.
124
See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, CORPORATE TAXES, WORLDWIDE
SUMMARIES: 2004–2005, at 36 (2004) (Austria imposes a 1% tax on initial
contributions of capital); id. at 295 (Greece imposes a 0.3% tax on sales of shares
listed on the Athens Stock Exchange); id. at 483 (Luxembourg imposes a 1% tax on
capital contributions); id. at 573 (the Netherlands impose a 0.55% tax on capital
contributions).
125
See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 42 (Comm. Print 2005)
(proposing unification of tax subsidies for education through a credit).
126
See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A
RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 9–11 (Comm. Print 2008)
(summarizing difference between tax subsidies and tax-induced structural
distortions).
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Market for Management

Like the market for control, the market for management as
presently instituted does not protect the tax authority’s interest
where it departs from that of shareholders.127 As explained
above, the market for management provides three distinct
benefits to shareholders.128 First, it minimizes executive’s cash
compensation. Second, it selects for the most self-confident, and
some argue competent, management.129
Third, and most
importantly, it makes managers and directors themselves equityholders—thus aligning their interest with those of their
127

A classic example where the market for management failed to the benefit of
the U.S. Treasury is the well known case of Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc.
2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1976). Kamin, the plaintiff, had filed a
derivative suit against the directors of American Express alleging that the directors
had breached their fiduciary duties by approving a distribution of depreciated shares
instead of selling the shares to realize the loss and thus decrease taxes at the
corporate level. Id. at 811–12, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810. The pleadings alleged that the
choice to distribute was motivated by the parameters of managerial compensation
contracts, which were tied to the earnings of American Express—earnings that
would have been reduced had the shares been sold rather than distributed. Id. at
814, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. Because the compensation of a majority of the directors
who approved the transaction was not dependent on whether the shares were sold or
distributed, the court dismissed the suit. Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811–12. The court’s
analysis did not consider the predicate question of whether one set of residual
claimants should be able to sue directors for failing to privilege them over another
set of residual claimants. While Kamin is no more than a well-known anecdote,
recent empirical research confirms a complex relationship between corporate
governance and tax avoidance. See Shuping Chen et al., Are Family Firms More Tax
Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 41 (2010) (providing
evidence that family firms engage in less tax management than broadly held firms
and arguing that the difference is owed to the complementarity between tax
avoidance and expropriation from outside shareholders); Mihir A. Desai &
Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value, 91 REV. ECON.
STAT. 537, 537–38 (2009) (showing that the quality of corporate governance
positively affects how much shareholders’ value increases in after-tax income due to
tax avoidance); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance
and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 146 (2006) [hereinafter HowPowered Incentives] (finding that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce
the level of tax sheltering); Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON.
591, 592 (2007); Omrane Guedhami & Jeffrey Pittman, The Importance of IRS
Monitoring to Debt Pricing in Private Firms, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 38, 38 (2008) (arguing
that expropriation from the tax authority is complementary to expropriation from
debtholders based on evidence that IRS audits decrease yields on debt issued by
private firms); see also Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with
Agency Costs, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1593, 1594–96 (2005) (proposing a model of firms’ tax
avoidance decision that accounts for the principal-agent relationship between the
firm and those who make the decision).
128
See Part I.B.5.
129
But see Heaton, supra note 83.
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principals. The first of these benefits does not fully redound to
the tax authority’s benefit. In calculating taxable income, the
Tax Code deliberately ignores certain expenditures on executive
compensation.130 For example, under section 162(m), deductions
for compensation to the chief executive officer and the next four
highest paid employees of public companies are limited to $1
million.131 As another example, under section 280G, certain
severance payments deemed “golden parachutes” are
nondeductible to public firms.132 The second of these benefits
accrues to the tax authority only to the extent that pretax income
correlates with after-tax income. The third benefit, like the
market for control, may actually run counter to the interests of
the tax authority as it incents management to maximize after-tax
income at the expense of tax receipts.
Legal revisions could expand the market for management to
further the tax authority’s interest. For example, executives in
every company could be granted a percentage of the firm’s tax
receipts representing a fraction of their equity interest. If the
fraction were one, any motivation to avoid taxes arising from
their equity stakes would be neutralized by their interest in the
tax receipts. Potentially, a fraction greater than one would be
required to countervail the pressure exerted by other
shareholders, who would continue to prefer any decrease in
pretax income to achieve an increase in after-tax income.133
130

See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 4–7 (2000).
131
I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2011); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884–86 (2007)
(explaining the history and operation of § 162(m)).
132
I.R.C. § 280G (2006 & Supp. II).
133
Compensation contracts may condition pay on accounting metrics—such as
“revenue,” “revenue growth,” “pretax profits,” “EBIT/EBITDA,” “return on assets,”
“return on operating income,” “return on capital,” and “cash flow”—and
nonaccounting metrics—such as “quality assurance,” “new business,” “market
share,” and “customer satisfaction”—that are independent of a firm’s tax expense.
See LANCE A. BERGER & DOROTHY R. BERGER, THE COMPENSATION HANDBOOK: A
STATE-OF-THE-ART GUIDE TO COMPENSATION STRATEGY AND DESIGN 334–35 (5th ed.
2008) (discussing use of accounting metrics in formula-value share plans that
reward lower tier management with equity based on “the organization’s earnings,
revenues, cash flow, or other combination of measures that the market might be
expected to consider in assigning value to the company or division”); KEN BERTSCH
ET AL., U.S. EXECUTIVE PAY STRUCTURE AND METRICS 6–7 (2006) (providing an
overview of accounting and nonaccounting based metrics); JAMES F. REDA & ASSOC.,
LLC, STUDY OF PERFORMANCE METRICS AMONG S&P 500 LARGE-CAP STOCK
COMPANIES 12 (2009) (showing that metrics unrelated to tax liability appear in
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A problem with granting management an interest in tax
receipts is the same as the problem with granting all
shareholders an interest in tax receipts. Specifically, as those
directing the firm grow indifferent between uses of pretax
income, the power of tax to incent legislatively desired behavior
decreases. In fact, if management is granted too great an
interest in tax receipts, disfavorable tax rates intended to deter
exploitative behavior may result in a reverse effect, encouraging
management to engage in conduct subject to high rates. That
said, in a second best world where revenue is excessively
compromised to regulatory goals, the implementation of such
interests might result in an improvement. Moreover, assuming
sufficiently high agency costs, this method may be preferable to
the sale of tax receivables as it would more efficiently target the
relevant decisionmakers.
As with the market for control, an alternative design could
preserve the regulatory power of the Tax Code and further its
revenue goals. If the Tax Code was redesigned so that its
regulatory goals were achieved exclusively through tax credits,
the market for management could be used to calibrate the
balance towards either regulation or revenues.134 In such a
world, management compensation could be based on a
combination of: (1) a fraction of tax credits earned by the firm,
and (2) a fraction of the firm’s taxable income, measured without
application of tax credits. To stress either the regulatory or the
revenue raising objectives, the former or latter fractions would be
increased, respectively. To ensure that shareholders could not
unwind the incentives to pursue objectives other than after-tax
earnings, limitations—such as nondeductibility to the firm and
high tax rates applicable to the executive—could be imposed on
performance compensation. Such an approach, however, would
thirty and one hundred percent of contracts for S&P 500 companies); Christopher D.
Ittner et al., The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts, 72
ACCT. REV. 231, 240 (1997) (observing that 12.8% of firms in a 312 firm sample
selected based on availability of proxy statements via Lexis/Nexis based short term
compensation on cash flow metrics). Directly rewarding management for increasing
the firm’s tax liability, however, may go beyond these accepted modes of
compensation and implicate the duty of loyalty. If that were the case, changes in the
tax regime to implement a market for management may have to be accompanied
with provisions preempting state law liability for breach of the duty of loyalty.
134
See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of
Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1763–64 (2005) (documenting behavioral
preferences as between deductions and credits).
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depend on being able to parse regulatory goals into credits. This
problem is far from trivial but is simpler than the problem of
actually jointly optimizing regulatory and revenue raising
goals.135
D. Periodic Dividends
Shareholders of U.S. corporations do not have a right to
receive a portion of a firm’s retained earnings via a dividend at
any time certain.136 Instead, they receive distributions only when
directors choose to declare them.
Directors are under no
obligation to declare dividends but are incented to declare them
through shareholder democracy and the market for management.
Presumably, if directors indefinitely delayed declaring dividends,
shareholders could vote to terminate them. Additionally, to the
extent director compensation includes stock, the board’s own
interest dictates eventual distribution. As discussed above, these
two safeguards do not protect the tax authority.
Mandatory dividends require firms to periodically distribute
a portion of their earnings to shareholders.
Generally,
mandatory dividends are found in jurisdictions where control
rights are otherwise weak.137 Shareholders in a firm that must
distribute its earnings as dividends are protected from earnings
being siphoned off for the benefit of other interest holders. The
cost of mandatory dividends is the same as their benefit—they
relieve directors of the choice of whether and when to distribute
earnings. In the absence of mandatory dividends, earnings may
be distributed or reinvested in the firm at the discretion of

135
For examples of scholarship advocating a shift to credits in the context of
personal taxation, see Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24–25 (2006); Daniel Shaviro,
The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 409–10 (1997).
136
See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 140 (1972) (“Even where there are
corporate earnings, the legal power to declare dividends is vested solely in the
corporate board.”).
137
Examples of countries with mandatory dividends include Brazil, Chile,
Columbia, Ecuador, Greece, and Uruguay. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1132 (1998) (discussing results that suggest “that
mandatory dividends are indeed a remedial legal protection for shareholders who
have relatively few other legal rights”).
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directors.138 Mandatory dividends allow reinvestment but vest
discretion with shareholders who may not know the
opportunities facing the firm as well as its directors. In
jurisdictions where shareholder democracy and the market for
management pose weak incentives for directors to look out for
the interests of shareholders, divesting directors of discretion is
less likely to injure shareholders. Where directors are fastidious
guardians of shareholders’ interests, the same will not be true.
Thus adding mandatory dividends to an already robust package
of control rights may do more harm than good.
A mandatory dividend is the primary control right enjoyed
by the U.S. tax authority. As already observed, the Treasury
does not participate in the election of directors, though law could
be altered so it would; the Treasury cannot sell its tax receipts to
those that could maximize their value, another legal artifact; and
the Treasury does not incent directors or officers to maximize tax
liability, again, a choice by those who write the law. Instead, the
tax authority relies on firms periodically reporting their taxable
income and remitting a share of it.139 As discussed below, this
system is critically sensitive to firms misreporting and
manipulating earnings. To minimize misreporting, the tax
authority benefits from extensive disclosure rights, well in excess
of those enjoyed by shareholders.
The design of the mandatory dividend that benefits the tax
authority differs from the basic design used to protect
shareholders. The difference is that the percentage of earnings
that must be distributed to the tax authority is based on how the
firm earns its income. For example, tax credits for certain
production processes deemed to be environmentally friendly
effectively lower firms’ tax rates whereas especially high tax
rates imposed on dispositions of wetlands effectively raise firms’
tax rates.140 By basing the mandatory dividend on the character

138

See Jensen, supra note 26 (explaining management’s incentives to retain
earnings rather than subject itself to investor discipline by relying on external
financing).
139
Every corporation is required to annually report and pay its tax liability.
I.R.C. § 6151(a) (2006) (requiring payment of tax at the time of filing a return); id.
§ 6072(b) (requiring every corporation to file a return on the fifteenth day of the
third month following the end of its fiscal year).
140
See id. §§ 45, 48 (favoring wind farms); id. § 1257(a)–(b) (disfavoring sales of
wetlands).
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of the production process, the tax authority balances revenue
raising with regulatory goals without injecting itself into
corporate governance.
E.

Disclosure Rights

Disclosure rights are held by both the tax authority and
shareholders,141 albeit, to different extents. Disclosure due to the
tax authority includes the filing of periodic tax returns142 and
where the tax authority chooses to audit a company, “[f]or the
purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made[, or] determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax,” the Treasury has
rights to “examine any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material to such inquiry . . . [,] to
summon . . . any officer or employee of such [company, and
to] . . . take such testimony of the person concerned, under
oath.”143 The rights to information enjoyed by the tax authority
as auditor are broader than the rights granted to shareholders.144
While the Treasury has access to all relevant “books, papers,
records, or other data,” which presumably includes all the
financial records available to shareholders, the Treasury may
also question company executives—a power shareholders do not
enjoy.145
Several explanations may be proposed for this
difference. For example, allowing any shareholder to summon
management to interrogation may paralyze the operations of the
141

See supra Part I.B.2.
See id. § 6001 (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury “to make such
returns, render such statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems
sufficient to show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title”); id.
§ 6011 (obligating taxpayers to provide information that may be requested in tax
returns); id. § 6012(a) (requiring corporations to file tax returns).
143
Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(a)–(b) (2007).
144
It may be argued that when shareholders perform the equivalent of an audit
by suing the firm for fraud under Rule 10b-5, discovery affords them comparable
access to information. An audit, however, is not predicated on a showing of
malfeasance that passes a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”) section 12(b)(6) and does not expose the IRS to potential liability under
FRCP section 11.
145
The Treasury is authorized to force shareholders to disclose certain suspect
transactions and has used this authority to require disclosure of reportable
transactions, listed transactions, and intermediary transactions. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(1) (reportable transactions); id. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (“listed transactions”);
I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730; I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299
(transactions with intermediaries to accomplish tax shelters).
142
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firm.146 Also, unlike the tax authority, shareholders may rely on
corporate democracy, the market for control, and the market for
management to incent a desirable level of disclosure indirectly.
Because the tax authority does not have recourse for these
alternate means of inducing directors and officers to look out for
its interests, it must mandate desirable behaviors and rely on
penalties to produce compliance.147
F.

Fiduciary Duties and Anti-Avoidance Doctrines148

Another difference between shareholders and the tax
authority is that the latter does not benefit from fiduciary duties.
Under direction of directors and officers, firms spend money to
reduce their tax liability and increase after-tax returns to
shareholders, who typically, through share-based compensation,
include directors and management.149 A fiduciary diverting
assets from shareholders to line her own pockets is in breach of
the duty of loyalty.150 There is no similar law that holds directors
and officers liable for purposefully diverting the tax authority’s

146

See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 53, at 2029–42 (describing the history of
exclusion of shareholder proposals relating to a “company’s ordinary business
operations” from proxy statements under Rule 14a-8).
147
See Anup Malani & Albert Choi, Are Non-Profit Firms Simply For-Profits in
Disguise? Evidence from Executive Compensation in the Nursing Home Industry 1–
2 (Sept. 26, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=617362 (providing evidence that because nonprofit firms cannot provide
incentive compensation to executives, they rely on the threat of termination to
induce managerial effort).
148
Subsequent to the writing of this Article, anti-avoidance doctrines were
codified in I.R.C. section 7701(o) (West 2011). Though the substance of the ensuing
discussion is unaffected, the codification obviates much of the case law relied on.
149
See How-Powered Incentives, supra note 127, at 145–46; Weisbach, supra
note 100, at 225 (“A blanket statement that we should get rid of tax
lawyers . . . clearly would be too broad . . . [but] we should not kid ourselves that tax
planning generally is productive (or is even merely worthless).”); Lawrence H.
Summers, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tackling the Growth of Corporate Tax
Shelters, Remarks to the Federal Bar Association (Feb. 28, 2000),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls421.htm.
150
See Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
515 S.E.2d 277, 287 (Va. 1999).
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share of the residual to shareholders.151 Whether this difference
is justified and what the alternatives are is the subject of this
Subpart.152
Presently, the tax authority is not left wholly unprotected
from intentional manipulation of taxable income. A set of “antiavoidance” doctrines work to prevent taxpayers from taking
advantage of unintended rate differentials.153 As explained
above, certain activities are taxed at higher rates than others.154
Some of these differences are the product of conscious decisions
by Congress to subsidize behaviors—for example, wind farmers
151

See Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why
Today’s Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No”, in
TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES
& OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 2009, at 975, 979 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning,
Course Handbook Series No. 19,889).
152
David A. Weisbach provides a framework for assessing incremental antiavoidance measures that compares their net benefit—including deadweight loss to
the avoidance of the incremental measure—to their administrative cost. David A.
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 88, 88 (2002). It could be argued that extending fiduciary duties has low net
benefits or high administrative costs. This argument poses what is essentially an
empirical question. That said, it is hard to explain why the net benefit from
extending fiduciary duties to the tax authority should be lower than the benefit of
extending them to shareholders. Furthermore, once courts have developed a doctrine
and had practice in its application, it seems unlikely that the administrative costs of
claims brought by the tax authority would exceed the administrative costs of claims
by private litigants. On first pass, it seems more appropriate to extend these
doctrines to benefit the tax authority than install them to benefit shareholders in
the first place. Conversely, if these doctrines are not efficient if applied to the tax
authority, they should not exist at all.
153
Though on its face the doctrine is as applicable to a taxpayer who takes
advantage of purposeful tax subsidies, in practice, it is not applied where the tax
preference is blatantly intentional. Tax avoidance doctrines do not threaten the
cumquat farmer cum wind farmer who made the switch to harvest tax credits,
though she may have sacrificed pretax income solely to reap the private benefit of
the tax credits. Leaving extreme cases aside, judicial power to determine tax
treatment through tax avoidance doctrines becomes less certain. Courts have
discretion to construe statutes where there is ambiguity and to produce interstitial
common law. Courts do not have discretion where a statute unambiguously governs
the conduct in question. Application of anti-avoidance doctrine, therefore, has to be
predicated on statutory uncertainty; in other words, as a threshold matter a court
must find that the statute does not govern the taxpayer’s conduct or that there is an
ambiguity as to the appropriate taxation of the conduct. See, e.g., Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Learned Hand’s Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J.
440, 472–73 (1968) (summarizing the evolution of Learned Hand’s decisions in the
area of tax avoidance, specifically, how they came to balance literal application of
the Tax Code with the enforcement of the implicit legislative purpose of preventing
tax avoidance).
154
See supra Part II.D.
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qualify for tax credits unavailable to cumquat farmers.155 Other
differences may be products of underspecification in the Tax
Code.156 Congresspersons cannot foresee every structure for
earning or losing income. Statutory ambiguities threaten the tax
authority, as equityholder, when they allow taxpayers to exploit
unintended rate differentials.
Tax avoidance doctrines157 generally disqualify taxpayers
from favorable treatment where the taxpayer’s conduct is
directed to minimizing taxes.158 More specifically, anti-avoidance
doctrines consist of a two-part test that evaluates whether
(1) “the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other
than obtaining tax benefits” and (2) the transaction posed “a
reasonable possibility of [pretax] profit.”159 The first component
155
See I.R.C. §§ 45, 48 (West 2011) (providing tax credits for wind farms but not
cumquat farms); see also id. § 38 (providing credits, for example, to oil recovery
projects, renewable electricity projects, ethanol production, nuclear power projects,
railroad track maintenance, employer provided childcare, orphan drugs, and mine
rescue training); id. § 162(c) (disallowing deductions for payments that are illegal
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
156
See Weisbach, supra note 152, at 93–94 (explaining anti-avoidance doctrines
as a substitute for underspecification).
157
Tax avoidance doctrines are referred to by various names. Compare Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (testing whether a
transaction is a “sham” and describing the test as composed of a subjective prong,
which asks whether the transaction had a nontax business purpose and an objective
prong, which asks whether the transaction posed a reasonable possibility of profit
and thus had nontax economic substance), with Long Term Capital Holdings v.
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 (D. Conn. 2004) (referring to “economic
substance analysis” as containing an objective and subjective prong).
158
See Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand, J., dissenting)
(“Except in rare instances statutes are written in general terms and do not
undertake to specify all the occasions that they are meant to cover; and their
‘interpretation’ demands the projection of their expressed purpose, upon occasions,
not present in the minds of those who enacted them. The Income Tax Act imposes
liabilities upon taxpayers based upon their financial transactions, and . . . [if] the
taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his beneficial
interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it . . . .”); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (adopting Learned Hand’s dissent); see also Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (holding that a transaction
will be respected if it is “compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities,
is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by taxavoidance features that have meaningless labels attached”).
159
Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985); see Black
& Decker, 436 F.3d at 441 (explaining that the sham transaction doctrine asks the
court to “find . . . [(1)] that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes
other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction, and [(2)] that the
transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit
exists” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
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is subjective, inquiring into the taxpayer’s motivations; the
second component is objective, asking whether a taxpayer could
reasonably expect a pretax profit from the transaction. Because
direct evidence of mental state is hard to come by, courts have
relied on the latter component when evaluating the former,
reasoning that if a reasonable expectation of profits did not
otherwise exist, the taxpayer was motivated by tax
minimization.160 As a result, though some courts formulate the
test as conjunctive requiring both the subjective and objective
components to be met and other courts phrase it as a multi-factor
balancing test allowing one component to substitute for the
other,161 effectively, the objective component is frequently
dispositive.162
The objective inquiry, which is sometimes referred to as the
“economic substance” test, asks whether the transaction had a
reasonable expectation of a pretax profit.163 If the answer is yes,
the transaction will be respected and the favorable tax treatment
granted. A crucial question in applying the economic substance
doctrine is how to define “profit.” Courts almost exclusively
adopt a naïve definition of profit, finding economic substance so
long as the gross income from the transaction exceeds its direct
costs.164 A more robust definition adopted by the District Court of
Connecticut in Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States
includes opportunity cost when measuring profit.165

109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX
EXPENDITURES 14–17 (Comm. Print 2005).
160
See Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 443 (explaining that the “ultimate
determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made . . . by
reference to [the] objective” component of the anti-avoidance test (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
161
See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781
(5th Cir. 2001) (noting that some courts require the absence of both subjective and
objective non-tax motives whereas others consider each a non-essential factor).
162
See, e.g., Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 443; Gilman v. Comm’r, 933 F.2d 143,
149 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing the objective inquiry as “the most important
element”).
163
See, e.g., Gilman, 933 F.2d at 147.
164
See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248–49 (3d Cir. 1998)
(summarizing prior holdings that disqualified transactions as lacking economic
substance, noting in each case that the transaction produced no more than a
“pittance,” if any, net income).
165
330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 182 (D. Conn. 2004) (including over $1.2 million in
foregone profits as a cost of the transaction when evaluating its “reasonably
expected . . . overall return” and stating “forfeiture of . . . potential profits is
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The naïve definition goes further than courts usually do
when determining whether a fiduciary satisfied her duty of
care.166 By inquiring into the substantive economic results of a
transaction, courts exceed the strictly procedural examination
used to test whether a fiduciary’s decision falls within her
business judgment.167 That said, the naïve definition does not
disqualify all those transactions that forego pretax profit to take
advantage of unintentionally favorable tax rates. The approach
taken in Long Term Capital Holdings, though limited to the facts
of that case, comes closer to forcing the taxpayer to simulate the
conduct of a single owner who was entitled to both the after-tax
income and tax receipts generated by a business.168
Where a choice motivated by a favorable tax rate does not
produce positive externalities, there is no economic justification
for treating the taxpayer to the favorable tax rate.169 Whether
there is a legal justification is ultimately a matter of statutory
application.170 To the extent the applicable statutes—filtered
through the relevant administrative actions—remain ambiguous,
judges are free to develop methods of construction to achieve
congressional intent. An ideal, though impracticable, canon of
construction would be that Congress does not write the Tax Code
to give taxpayers the choice between two different tax rates.
When a legislative ambiguity poses such a choice, that ambiguity
should be resolved by foreclosing the treatment that results in
lower pretax profit. This ensures that tax does not incentivize
private parties to forego social welfare. So, for example, if a
taxpayer can consummate a transaction in one of two ways, one
of which will cost one hundred thousand dollars in legal fees and
appropriately assessed against [the taxpayer] as a cost of the transaction that a
prudent economic actor would have taken into account”).
166
The business judgment rule does not relax the duty of care if the fiduciary is
shown to lack good faith. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705–06 (Del. 2009).
167
As a result, the common law protects the tax authority both more and less
than common shareholders. While managers and directors do not owe the Treasury
a duty of loyalty, the substantive results of their business decisions may be
challenged. See supra Part I.B.3.
168
Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (noting that its inclusion
of opportunity cost in the calculation of economic profit was appropriate “[u]nder the
circumstances here”).
169
See Weisbach, supra note 102, at 224.
170
See David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and Legislative
Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579, 581 (2000) (“To analyze the efficacy of [policy motivated tax
benefits], however, as well as to develop and administer them properly, one must
know what Congress was trying to exempt and why.”).
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the other will cost twice that, the taxpayer should be subject to
the tax rate applicable to the first alternative, whether or not
that tax rate is the lower of the two. It is doubtful, however, that
outside the rare cases such as Long Term Capital Holdings, in
which the pretax rates on the alternatives were known, such a
canon could be operationalized.
As an alternative to strengthening anti-avoidance doctrines,
the duties of care and loyalty already imposed on fiduciaries
could be extended so that they benefit the tax authority.171
Courts could construe the Tax Code to provide for federal
common law fiduciary duties.172 When management sacrifices
pretax profit to benefit shareholders—a constituency that
because of the widespread use of share-based compensation
usually includes management—management commits the
economic offense of a disloyal agent. If the duty of loyalty to the
tax authority were imposed on directors and officers, that duty
would have to be tempered to ensure that congressionally
intended avoidance would occur.
Where a statute
unambiguously prescribed favorable tax treatment, such
prescription could be treated as a carveout from fiduciary
obligations that authorizes sacrifice of pretax for after-tax profits.
The current regime imposes ethical, civil, and even criminal
penalties on tax attorneys who assist in forms of tax evasion.
Whether adding civil liability for directors and officers for tax
avoidance is desirable depends on the equity and efficiency
considerations.173 Efficiency concerns would require assessing
whether deadweight loss would decrease or potentially increase
as additional avoidance maneuvers were taken to avoid the new
rule. Efficiency may also be affected by the administrative and

171
While bold, this proposition is not radical. Directors and officers of FDIC
insured banks, for example, are subject to a federal duty of care. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)
(2006 & Supp. II); see Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 216 (1997).
172
See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (“Whether
to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial
policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of
the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state
law.’ ”).
173
See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters,
and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 237 (2000) (using marginal efficiency of
cost of funds to assess desirability of a change in the tax law).
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error costs from applying the rule. The benefits, however, may
be significant as officers ultimately have to approve if not initiate
tax avoidance maneuvers.174
One objection to extending the benefit of fiduciary duties to
the tax authority distinguishes between shareholders and
government based on the latter’s ability to write the tax law how
it will.175 Roughly, this argument is that the tax authority can
unilaterally add to its control rights. This objection is not wholly
satisfying because while theoretically Congress or the Treasury
can always revise the Tax Code or Treasury Regulations, such
revisions are not costless. They require time and consideration
on the part of legislators—agency personnel. Furthermore, this
argument (1) applies equally to anti-avoidance doctrines, which
nevertheless exist and (2) does not address that shareholders are
also free to change corporate bylaws. The ability to unilaterally
change the control rights accompanying an economic stake in a
firm does not distinguish shareholders from the tax authority. A
second argument in the same vein observes that the tax
authority can unilaterally change its economic rights by, for
example, raising tax rates or disallowing deductions for interest.
Such changes, however, affect all firms and not just those
abusing the tax system. Accordingly, the government cannot
simply increase its economic rights to make up for weak control
rights if it does not want to further raise tax rates on compliant
firms. That said, even if none of the differences between
shareholders and the tax authority justify granting one but not
the other the benefit of fiduciary duties, it does not necessarily
follow that those benefits should be extended to the tax
authority. Perhaps, instead, fiduciaries should be absolved of all
duties.
III. THE RISK TAX
Part II described the differences between the control rights
enjoyed by the typical shareholder and those enjoyed by the tax

174
See Corporate and Partnership Enforcement Issues Before the Subcomm. on
Finance, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Tax Division) (explaining that “[s]ophisticated tax professionals promote [tax
shelters to] key officers in . . . business entities”).
175
But see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1995) (holding the
United States liable for damages where legislation has the effect of breaching a
contract executed among a federal agency and a private party).
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authority.
Mandatory periodic dividends ensure the tax
authority its share of earnings without suspending the
congressionally intended influence of differential tax rates and
without injecting the tax authority into the governance of the
firm. Disclosure obligations and anti-avoidance doctrines protect
the tax authority from misrepresentation and manipulation,
respectively, of the parameters that determine the amount of the
dividend.
Having recognized that the mandatory dividend is a design
choice rather than an inevitable feature of a tax regime, this Part
considers its consequences, specifically, the purchase the
mandatory dividend provides Congress on taxpayers’ risk
policies.176 Implementation of a mandatory dividend in favor of
the tax authority poses a series of subtle administrative
questions as to whether and how negative taxable income in a
period should be allowed to offset positive taxable income in
another period. As discussed above, when a share is issued, the
proceeds less transaction costs go to the firm.177 The residual to
which shareholders have claims consists of that capital,
augmented by retained earnings, decreased by dividends paid.
When expenses from a period exceed gross income, the residual
available to shareholders is reduced by the net loss. Thus, in a
period where income is negative, shareholders lose value.178 This
is not necessarily the case for the tax authority. The tax
authority receives a share of taxable income so long as it is
positive.
Subject to a taxpayer’s rights to “carryback” or
“carryforward” its losses discussed below, negative taxable
income does not affect the tax authority.179
If tax liability for a given year were calculated without any
reference to income in other years, the tax authority would bear
no downside: If a year’s taxable income were positive, the tax
176
These results are well known to the literature. See Mitchell A. Kane, Risk
and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. REV. 867, 869 n.5
(2006) (reviewing literature).
177
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
178
The loss is bounded by shareholders’ initial investment in the firm, absent
veil piercing. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418–19, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–9,
276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588–89 (1966).
179
See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation
and Risk-Taking, 58 Q. J. ECON. 388, 389 (1944) (“By imposing an income tax on the
investor, the Treasury appoints itself as his partner, who will always share in his
gains, but whose share in his losses will depend upon the investor’s ability to offset
losses against other income.”).
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authority would receive a share of that income; if a year’s taxable
income were negative, the tax authority—unlike a shareholder—
would not lose a dime. As is, however, the tax authority does
partially share in the downside. When a firm experiences
negative taxable income, it may carry its losses back against
taxable income from the two prior years by amending its returns
from those years to deduct those losses.180 Excess losses may be
carried forward to offset taxable income in the following twenty
years.
In the absence of carrybacks and carryforwards, firms would
face incentives to reduce the volatility of their earnings.181 Being
unable to offset losses in one period against gains in another,
firms with higher earnings volatility would pay more in taxes in
the fat years and no less in the lean years. The incentives
become apparent when comparing nominal after-tax returns of
two hypothetical corporations subject to a 30% tax rate, shown in
Table 3.a. Each corporation initially has $100 in capital.
Corporation X chooses to pursue a higher volatility project, which
produces a 10% pretax loss half of the time and a 40% pretax
gain the other half. Corporation Y chooses a more conservative
project, which produces a 10% pretax gain half the time and a
20% pretax gain the other half. Table 3.a summarizes the
projects’ returns.
Table 3.a: Pretax Rates of Return
Low

High

Corp. X

-10.00%

40.00%

Expected
15.00%

Corp. Y

10.00%

20.00%

15.00%

Based on these assumed parameters, the corporations’
pretax income, taxes, and after-tax income are shown in Tables
3.b, 3.c, and 3.d, respectively.

180

See I.R.C. § 172 (West 2011). It is worth emphasizing that—to the extent that
tax accounting tracks firm cash flows—refunds on account of carrybacks are likely to
be made during times a firm is cash starved and thus in danger of being unable to
satisfy its obligations as they come due. Thus, carrybacks serve to cushion firms
against bankruptcy.
181
See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 4 (explaining that the increase of tax
rates in the absence of complete loss sharing would theoretically have uncertain
results, but “practical evidence would indicate that the investor is likely to shift in
the direction of less risk”).
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Table 3.b: Taxes Paid
Low

High

Corp. X

$90.00

$140.00

Expected
$115.00

Corp. Y

$110.00

$120.00

$115.00

Table 3.b shows what is not unexpected. Two corporations
equally capitalized and engaging in projects with the same
average rate of return are expected to have the same income.
Table 3.c: Taxes Paid
Low

High

Expected

Corp. X

$0.00

$12.00

$6.00

Corp. Y

$3.00

$6.00

$4.50

Table 3.c illustrates the asymmetry produced when the tax
authority is insulated from any downside. Note that Corporation
X is expected to pay higher taxes than Corporation Y because
while the two have the same expected rate of return, Corporation
X pays additional taxes in the high return scenario but its losses
in the low return scenario do not affect its tax liability. The
asymmetry is reflected in Table 3.c, which shows the
corporations’ after-tax position at the end of the first period,
reflecting an additional $1.50 in after-tax wealth.
Table 3.d: After-tax Positions
Low

High

Corp. X

$90.00

$128.00

Expected
$109.00

Corp. Y

$107.00

$114.00

$110.50

Obviously, the figures above are driven by the initial
parameters—for example, initial capitalization, the rates of
return, and the tax rate—but the observation that absent
carryovers, taxpayers will prefer an income distribution with a
smaller average loss in favor of one with a greater average loss,
where the two distributions are otherwise equal, remains true
across all initial parameters.182
182

See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1102 (proving that ceteris paribus, the
least volatile stream of pretax income will produce the highest after-tax return in a
progressive tax system). Though generally depressing equityholders’ appetites for
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Carryovers expose the tax authority to the downside because
they allow the taxpayer to decrease its taxable income in those
years in which it is positive by losses from other years. Thus,
carryovers reduce incentives to avoid projects that pose higher
average losses. If Corporation X could carryforward its losses, its
$10 loss in the low return scenario would reduce taxable income
in subsequent periods by $10. Assuming tax rates remained
constant, the nominal after-tax value of the $10 deduction is $3—
the product of the deduction and the tax rate. Thus, the after-tax
wealth of Corporation X in the low scenario increases by $3 to
$93, and its expected wealth increases by half that amount183 to
equal Corporation Y’s expected wealth.
Carryforwards do not wholly neutralize the incentive to
decrease earnings volatility once the time-value of money is
accounted for.184 Assuming a constant positive discount rate, it
can be shown that the net present after-tax value decreases with
the average pretax loss of an income distribution though its
pretax mean remains constant. This can be illustrated by
returning to the example of Corporations X and Y. Table 3.e
reviews the returns to the two corporations in each of the
scenarios for the first year, showing the pretax returns, taxes
paid, and after-tax returns as the set of columns under YEAR 1.
Assuming that the after-tax proceeds from the first year are
reinvested, the columns under YEAR 2 show the pretax returns,
taxes paid, and after-tax returns that would be received in year
two given that those proceeds earn a 15% return.185

risk, if a firm is already insolvent, taxes may actually increase risk appetites. See id.
at 1096.
183
Half of $3.00—$1.50.
184
It should be noted that the preceding paragraph spoke in terms of the
deduction’s nominal value.
185
For example, the pretax figure in the low scenario for Corporation X reflects
the results of investing $90 at a 15% rate of return.
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Table 3.e: Effect of Discount Rate
YEAR 1

YEAR 2

Pretax
Low

High

Expected

Low

High

Expected

Corp. X

$90.00

$140.00

$115.00

$103.50

$147.20

$125.35

Corp. Y

$110.00

$120.00

$115.00

$123.05

$131.10

$127.08

Tax
Low

High

Expected

Low

High

Expected

Corp. X

$0.00

$12.00

$6.00

$1.05

$5.76

$3.41

Corp. Y

$3.00

$6.00

$4.50

$4.82

$5.13

$4.97

After-tax
Low

High

Expected

Low

High

Expected

Corp. X

$90.00

$128.00

$109.00

$102.45

$141.44

$121.95

Corp. Y

$107.00

$114.00

$110.50

$118.24

$125.97

$122.10

Note that a 15% return in the year two produces a higher
gain—$13.50186—on the $90 invested by Corporation X in the low
return scenario than the amount Corporation X lost in the
preceding year—$10.00—so the full carryforward is used up.187
Notwithstanding the full deduction of the carryforward,
Corporation X receives less in after-tax income than Corporation
Y.188 The intuition for this is that a $1 decrease in income is
shared by shareholders and the tax authority so long as the
resulting income is positive, but a $1 increase in loss is borne
solely by shareholders until such time as the firm returns to

186

Fifteen percent of $90 or $13.50.
The assumption that returns in the second year are positive and sufficient to
use up the full carryforward from the first year is conservative. If, for example,
returns in the second year formed the same distribution as in the first, there would
be a 50% likelihood that the $10 carryforward from the first year would go unused
and an additional $9 carryforward is generated. As this paragraph explains,
carryforwards constitute interest free loans from tax payers to the tax authority.
188
Again, the figures are a function of initial assumptions. The $0.15 disparity
between expected pre-tax earnings of corporations X and Y is equal to the cost of
capital of Corporation’s X expected deduction ($10.00 x .50 x 0.3 x 1.15 =) $1.725.
187
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positive income. And at such time, the shareholders are not
made whole for the time value of money that was used to cover
the tax authority’s share of the losses.189
To unpack the intuition, let us compare the consequence on
after-tax income of the marginal dollar of costs when income is
positive to the marginal dollar of costs when income is negative.
In the first case, the marginal dollar of costs reduces after-tax
income only by “1-t” of a dollar where “t” is the tax rate, because
but for that loss, the corporation would have had a dollar more in
pretax income but paid “t” of that dollar to the tax authority. In
the second case, however, the marginal dollar of costs initially
reduces after-tax income by the full dollar—assuming that the
loss cannot be carried back against prior years’ income. If and
when a period arrives in which the corporation returns to
positive income, that dollar of cost will be deducted from the
period’s gains. But for that deduction, the corporation would
have paid tax on an additional dollar of income, or “t” of that
dollar. Thus, eventually, the nominal after-tax loss attributable
to the marginal dollar of costs becomes “1-t” of a dollar, whether
the costs are incurred while the firm is in the black or the red. In
real terms, however, the after-tax loss is greater when incurred
while in the red because between incurring the full dollar in cost
and being refunded “t” dollars, the taxpayer loses returns on
those “t” dollars.
Thus, despite carryforwards, equity holders face a “risk tax,”
which leaves shareholders with higher after-tax income if the
firm engages in the project with the minimum average loss given
a set of projects with equal expected pretax income.190 It is
important to note that the risk tax is produced by a difference in
treatment between a marginal dollar of cost that reduces positive
income and a marginal dollar of cost that increases loss. It is for
this reason that the risk tax affects taxpayers’ attitudes towards

189
This assumes: (1) that taxable income measures real economic income;
(2) that carrybacks are insufficient to fully soak up the losses incurred; and (3) a
constant tax rate.
190
See Green & Talmor, supra note note 4, at 1108 (“The incentive effects of the
government’s tax option may be mitigated by the firm’s ability to carry losses
forward and back across periods. These opportunities fall short of a fully
proportional tax for two reasons. First, the time-value of money implies taxes paid
today are more valuable than rebates received tomorrow. Second, losses in future
periods are uncertain, so if losses can only be carried back a finite number of years,
there is always some probability that the taxes will never be refunded.”).
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average loss rather than volatility generally. Nevertheless,
purely as shorthand, the effect will be referred to as a tax on risk
or volatility.191
Unlike carryforwards, which require shareholders to wait
until a period of positive income before they can share a period’s
losses with the tax authority, carrybacks force the tax authority
to immediately participate in a net loss. Effectively, a regime
that allows a firm to carryback its losses X years, delays the
mandatory dividend X years. On first pass, this result may
suggest that the insufficiency of carryforwards to compensate a
taxpayer for losses is academic.
As a practical matter,
carrybacks are insufficient to make firms risk neutral for two
reasons.192 First, they only apply to established firms that have
had income in their prior years. Thus, a firm choosing its
original projects must look to carryforwards to refund startup
costs from its initial years. Second, the carryback period is short:
two years in the U.S. and zero years in many other countries.193
Thus a firm with a long history of strong earnings that incurs net
losses for several years may find itself unable to do anything with
those losses except wait for the storm to pass. Even an
established firm in choosing between projects, therefore, will take
into account the possibility of a string of bad years that force it to
rely on carryforwards.194
Having unpacked the effects of carryforwards and
carrybacks on firms’ appetites for risk, we can now describe the
set of policy instruments that mandatory dividends provide. Just
as Congress can change the minimum pretax return of projects a
taxpayer will engage in by changing the tax rate, Congress can
191
Again, it is worth remembering that some risk is diversifiable while some
risk may be systemic. See supra note 24.
192
See David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX. L. REV. 1, 34
(2004) (noting that “loss limitations often mean that losses cannot be fully deducted,
which in turn means that losses effectively are taxed at a different rate than are
gains”).
193
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 124 (summarizing tax
regime in each covered country, and where a country provides for carrybacks,
explaining their period and applicable limitations, if any). Countries that do not
provide carrybacks include Australia, id. at 24, Austria, id. at 36, Belgium, id. at 69,
China, id. at 158, Costa Rica, id. at 181, Croatia, id. at 189, Cyprus, id. at 196,
Czech Republic, id. at 205, and Ecuador, id. at 227.
194
See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and
Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 134 (1992) (noting that such tax benefits may
encourage mergers, specifically, that a “merger effectively provides coinsurance by
diversifying expected cash flows, so that deductions will not be wasted”).
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change the maximum average loss of a project a taxpayer will
engage in by changing the carryover period.195 To increase risk
tolerance, Congress can extend the carryback period one year. To
increase it a little less, Congress can instead extend the
carryforward period a year or increase the carryback while
decreasing the carryforward.196 But playing with the carryover
periods is not the sole means to influencing taxpayers’ attitudes
to risk. Congress can make losses more expensive by increasing
the tax rate. This is evident by returning to where the intuition
for the risk tax is presented. Note that the tax authority defers
sharing in “t” cents of each dollar of loss. The greater the tax
rate, the greater the loss the tax authority defers sharing in, and
thus the more expensive the marginal dollar of loss for the
shareholders. This means that an increase in U.S. tax rates has
two countervailing effects. First, as has been amply discussed,
given the global competition for capital, the increase will prompt
U.S. corporations to choose projects with higher pretax returns to
remain attractive to capital.197 The shift will be at the expense of
additional risk. Second, the increase in the tax rate increases the
taxpayer’s exposure to downside. This makes additional risk less
attractive, thus dampening the first effect.198 In all likelihood,
195
Cf. Dale W. Jorgenson, Capital Theory and Investment Behavior, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 247, 248 (1963) (modeling and testing effects of changes in tax rates on
the selection of projects by firms); Mervyn A. King, Taxation and the Cost of Capital,
41 REV. ECON. STUD. 21, 34 (1974).
196
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) extended
the loss carryback period from two years to five years but did so only for small
businesses. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5
§ 1211(a) (Feb. 17, 2009). Whether the resulting transfer from taxpayers to
unsuccessful small businesses and the additional incentives for risk taking are
justifiable is a question for policymakers to consider. See Daniel Shaviro, The 2008–
09 Financial Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform 12–16 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law,
Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1442089.
197
See Weisbach, supra note 192, at 6–7 (explaining why it is relatively easy for
even uninformed investors to adjust for changes in the tax regime by looking at
after-tax returns). See generally Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning
Multi-Jurisdictional Tax Competition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel Esty & Damien Gerardin eds.,
Oxford 2001).
198
In a progressive tax system, it is volatility of earnings as well as average loss
that is taxed. See Green & Talmor, supra note 4, at 1096 (“It is shown that the firm’s
objective function assumes the form of its before-tax net present value less the value
of a call option representing its tax liability. The convex ‘shape’ of this liability leads
to risk-averse behavior.”). Given two firms with identical average pretax earnings,
more of the earnings of the one with higher volatility will be taxed at the higher
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the second effect will outweigh the first.199 If the net effect can be
determined, the adjustment of the carryover period or the tax
rate allows the government to dial risk taking across the
economy.
CONCLUSION
There are at least two stages to legal evolution. First, an
alternative to the status quo must be articulated. Second, the
desirability of that alternative should be assessed. This Article
began by observing that the tax authority’s economic interest in
corporations is fundamentally similar to that of shareholders, yet
its control rights are extremely different.
It used that
observation to open up a space of design possibilities for revising
how the tax authority is protected from corporate exploitation of
unintended rate differentials. It accompanied the proposals with
objections to them, consistently encountering the tradeoff
between increasing revenues and decreasing desired behavioral
shifts. Though this Article attempted to identify some of the
consequences to its proposals, it did not attempt to net these
consequences. Thus it offers no conclusions regarding the
desirability of the proposals. Having broadened the design space
of tax regimes, it leaves it to subsequent scholarship to assess
whether any of the proposed designs are worth adopting.
What this Article does do, however, is show that there won’t
be easy answers. While it remains agnostic as to the right
devices with which to balance regulatory and revenue raising
goals, this Article means to leave no question that there is a
tradeoff. Any proposal that claims to increase the tax base by
reducing the incidence of regulated parties taking advantage of
incentives should be scrutinized for its effect on compliance; and
reciprocally, any proposal that claims to increase compliance
should be scrutinized for its effect on revenues.
Finally, it is worth noting that the tradeoff between revenue
and compliance itself may simply pose a question of means
rather than ends. After all, government revenue is ultimately
used to effect government policy. If that policy is effected
directly—by the government raising money and then spending it
rates. While U.S. corporations face only limited rate progressivity, the earnings of
U.S. limited liability companies, partnerships, and other entities that receive pass
through tax treatment are effectively taxed at the rates facing their interestholders.
199
See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 4.
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on employees that produce the work it wants to done—that is
simply a substitute for those goals being accomplished indirectly,
by offering private parties incentives to do the desired work on
their own. Viewed in the abstract, a government simply has
policy goals, and how it goes about achieving those goals is a
question of engineering.

